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ABSTRACT
AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE RIO GRANDE IN THE PANAMA
CANAL ZONE, 1521 —1950
Francisco Javier Bonilla
April 15, 2016
This thesis is an examination of the history of environmental change in the
defunct Rio Grande river valley in the former Panama Canal Zone. By mining secondary
sources and engineering records, this study provides a narrative of the historic river’s role
in the formation of the so-called interoceanic corridor through the isthmus of Panama
from 1521 to 1950. More importantly, however, as a case study of river histories in Latin
American environmental history, this understudied, Pacific-draining river illustrates how
culture and non-human nature made Panama’s strategic transit region into a loci for
material flows over time.
The Rio Grande played a vital role in the establishment of the Spanish colonial
mule road during the colonial period. The nineteenth century ushered in the
industrialization of the corridor, initiated with the construction of the Panama Railroad by
American capitalists. Great advances in hydraulic technology led to the first serious canal
building efforts in the area, with the French effort succumbing to an unyielding nature.
The Panama Canal, built by the US government, led to a radical reorganization of the
area’s socioecological systems. This thesis applies the concept of social metabolism and
the ‘cultural landscape’ to understand material change in central Panama.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1955, the Panama Canal Review, a magazine distributed to American
personnel living in the Canal Zone, committed an early act of environmental journalism.
It reported that a river in the Canal’s Watershed, the Río Grande, had flowed into the
ground at a point in its hilly upper valley, in the narrowest point of the Great Continental
Divide. Under the headline: “Zone's Historic Rio Grande Does Sudden Disappearing
Act,” the Review called attention to this unusual event. To avoid confusion with the most
famous Río Grande in the American social imaginary, it notes that this stream “isn't the
shallow river bordering the southern part of Texas,” but the Rio Grande “explored 400
years ago by the Spanish in their search of an overland communication between Atlantic
and Pacific across… Panama.”1
The Río Grande no longer exists in any form resembling its natural course. In the
first decade of the twentieth century, U.S. engineers completely transformed the structure
of its fluvial drainage system into what became known as the Panama Canal Watershed.
The defunct river used to run from the central mountains of the isthmus toward the
Pacific, taking the flow of a significant number of streams along the way. Across the
Central American mountainous backbone just past the headwaters of the Río Chagres’s

1

“Zone’s Historic Rio Grande Does Sudden Disappearing Act,” Panama Canal Review, Aug. 5, 1955.
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southernmost tributary began the meandering valley of the strategic Río Grande, snaking
down the slope through alluvial lands south to Panama City.
The river, at a point where it was just a sluggish mountain stream and still flowed
naturally, burrowed in due to its bed being filled with rock from a nearby hill.2 The filling
of the riverbed was “designed to stabilize the slopes of adjacent hills” and “raised the
grade of the river 20 feet or more for a distance of several hundred feet.” The river
reacted to an abrupt ecosystem disturbance, resulting from environmental management
work connected to routine maintenance operations of the waterway. The Review writer
ascribed agency to the river, claiming the stream had not “taken calmly to this manmade
innovation” and appeared to “prefer its original bed” instead by running underground. If
nothing else, this anecdotal event reveals the extent to which the operation of the Panama
Canal, not just its initial construction, has entailed a continuous reworking of nature to
ensure uninterrupted maritime traffic across the isthmus. It illustrates how space and
environments have been historically, socially, and naturally produced.
Moreover, the piece chronicles the role played by the Río Grande in the history of
Panama as a land bridge and transoceanic route. Despite his or her legitimizing tone, the
unnamed, de-facto environmental beat reporter for the Review demonstrated some
knowledge of the river’s past. “The Rio Grande of the isthmus has been tied in closely
with local progress since the beginning of recorded history,” the article claimed. It then
briefly traced the role of the stream within the different routes of interoceanic
communication that have existed through central Panama: the Spanish mule-road, the
first Transcontinental Railroad, the failed French Canal, and the American Canal. Aware

2

The filling of the riverbed was “designed to stabilize the slopes of adjacent hills” and “has raised the
grade of the river 20 feet or more for a distance of several hundred feet.” Ibid.
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of the complications that characterized the provision of adequate sanitation and potable
water during the Panama Canal’s construction, the writer even makes mention of the “old
Rio Grande reservoir” in the river’s upper valley, “which once supplied water for the
entire Pacific district between Culebra,” at the continental divide, “and Panama City.”3
The Review’s report might also hint at another important element of the Río
Grande’s history. Zonians, or American colonists in Panama, at least at mid-century, had
a clear idea of what the nature their forefathers had allegedly conquered actually looked
like. Thirty-five years after the opening of the canal when the piece was written, the Río
Grande’s geomorphology had been irremediably damaged. However, the Zonian writer
opted to neglect the fact that, had the stream remained aboveground seeking its natural
course beyond the filling, it would have had to traverse a physiography radically altered
by locks, dams, diversions, and dikes. The reporter used the old name of the river and
valley to denote a meager surviving stream that did not resemble the historical Río
Grande. The surviving stream’s unruly response to human induced environmental change
does, however, highlight the basin’s storied history within transnational networks of
flows. This thesis uses this documented moment of sudden fluvial change reported by the
Review as a baseline from which to reconstruct the much longer history of ecological
change affecting the environmental and social spaces of this forgotten river valley.
Although a very unique case, the friction between local, transnational, and natural
forces that drove change in central Panama’s ecosystems resonates with other places
throughout the region and the world-system’s periphery, which proved easy targets for
foreign capitalist and imperial schemes of resource use during the twentieth century.
Most residents of Panama, a nation of just under four million, would be hard pressed to
3

Ibid.
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locate the historic watershed of the Río Grande or the estuarine mangrove forest at its
mouth, which existed just west of the capital. Our understanding of the origins of presentday issues and conflicts over freshwater access and availability— a political ecology
issue with ties to the urbanization and expanding ecological footprint of the capital,
Panama City— could benefit from a more comprehensive knowledge of the evolution of
the landscapes reproducing inequalities at the edges of the Panama Canal. The
construction and operation of the lock-based waterway articulates with the longer history
of the Río Grande and, thus, with the history of Panama City and its hinterland, not to
mention the history of the modern Republic of Panama.
This study posits the Río Grande’s trajectory as a window through which to
examine central Panama’s changing environment from a glocal perspective. The Rio
Grande’s history has never been examined under the lens of environmental history.
Framing this river valley’s changes through the prism of the region’s interoceanic
corridor and water use allows a better understanding of how the isthmus’s transit tradition
and the corresponding organization of human labor altered society’s relation to nature in
situated and material ways. The co-evolution between Panama’s transit landscapes and
society was a protracted process, one in which nature, technology, capital, and power
came together to reshape the watershed, the communities therein, and Panama’s modern
history.
The long and protracted process of environmental change in the Rio Grande
valley spans millennia; this thesis only surveys approximately the last six centuries of the
defunct river’s environmental history in relation to social metabolism. With the arrival of
the Spanish in the early sixteenth century, the transisthmian corridor in the isthmus’s

4

narrowest point was established as the ‘official’ imperial route, inserted within an early
capitalist network of flows. This spatial arrangement of Panama’s population and
productive activity was to persist until the twenty first century. The re-organization of the
Rio Grande basin during the U.S. construction of the canal (1904 -14) stands out as one
of the most significant and meaningful transformations deriving from the industrialization
of interoceanic transit. This thesis will build upon secondary and primary sources, mostly
engineering reports, to trace the material changes of the river and its basin in connection
to the changing relationship between humans and the natural world on the isthmus.
Adopting the prisms of human labor and water use can elucidate the material and cultural
legacies of imperialism, and help illuminate how historical contexts altered landscapes in
unequal ways over time and space.

5

THE ISTHMIAN RIO GRANDE: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THEORY

Until recent decades, the historiography of the Panama Canal was infused with a
‘triumphalist’ tone dating back to the construction era. American tropes about the
construction of the canal had traditionally framed the narrative as a ‘conquest over
nature,’ usually revolving around the taming of the formidable Rio Chagres in the
Caribbean slope or the piercing of the Culebra mountain cut. As Panamanian historian
Bonifacio Pereira Jimenez stated, “The history of Panama is, to a certain extent, the
history of the Rio Chagres.”4 Pereira Jimenez was not mistaken as to the importance that
the Río Chagres had for the development of the interoceanic corridor across centuries.
This focus on the Caribbean basin has hindered a more nuanced understanding of area’s
historical geography, with detrimental implications for advancing Panama’s
environmental history and Panama City’s urban history. However, shifting the focus to
the Pacific basin sheds light on the transformation of the immediate hinterland and river
systems of the country’s largest metropolitan city, and thus on the origins of the
contemporary environmental problems of the metropolitan area.
The history of Panama’s transit activity, its raison d’etre, lies at the intersection of
environmental history and the history of imperialism in the region. Intellectual
frameworks have been developed that enable us to understand the process by which the
natural world underwent significant degradation in the modern colonial world, mainly as
4

Bonifacio Pereira Jimenez, Biografia del Rio Chagres (Panama City: Imprenta Nacional, 2nd ed., 1964), 33.

6

a result of the onset of capitalist relations of labor, and its influence on human’s views of
the natural world.
In the early twentieth century, intellectuals in the neo-imperial metropoles were
already starting to question the ecological impact of extractivism on the colonies and
imperial spheres of influence. The French geographer Jean Brunhes developed the
concept of Raubwirtschaft,5 or plunder economy, to understand the situated differential
exploitation of natural resources by natives and ‘civilized’ groups that move in later.6
Years later, Carl Sauer, the father of American historical geography, also questioned how
much of what we hailed as production was in reality just extraction. In 1938, Sauer,
aware of the impact his country had had on the natural resources of humid tropical
America, urged scholars to evaluate all colonial cultures “by the use it makes of the land
it occupies.”7
Sauer’s adherents became concerned with the despoliation associated with
extractive frontiers and its legacies.8 These scholars became the chief proponents of the
“cultural landscape”9 as a cross-disciplinary approach to blur the problematic boundaries
5

Brunhes built on the concept originated by German geographer Ernst Friedrich (b. 1867), initially used to
denote a type of occupation where there is no intention of developing the colony economically more than
strictly needed for exploitation purposes. For a history of the concept, see Joan Martinez-Alier, De la
Economía Ecológica al Ecologismo Popular (Barcelona: Icaria Editorial, 1994), 63 – 64.
6
Jean Brunhes, La Géographie Humaine. Essai de classification positive. Principes et exemples (Paris: Félix
Alcan, 1910). For an explicit examination of this concept applied to the field of Latin American
environmental history, see Guillermo Castro Herrera, “Environmental History (Made) in Latin America,” HNET Global Historiography Series (2001).
7
Carl O. Sauer, “Destructive Exploitation in Modern Colonial Expansion” (1938) in Carl Sauer on Culture
and Landscape: Readings and Commentaries, eds. William M. Denevan and Kent Matthewson (Baton
Rouge, LA: LSU press, 2009); 245.
8
Sauer established what became known as the “Berkley School” of geographic thought. Their work
contained “dire warnings about resource depletion, species extinction, soil erosion, and overpopulation”
which “signaled a renewed geographic interest in the limits of the earth to sustain human populations in
the modern age.”8 For a comprehensive expression of Berkley School themes, see Man's Role in Changing
the Face of the Earth, ed. William L. Thomas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).
9
Sauer argued that “The works of man express themselves in the cultural landscape. There may be a
succession of these landscapes with a succession of the cultures. They are derived in each case from the
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of the nature-culture binary. Recent scholarship of this type on Latin America’s historical
ecology has fruitfully questioned the “pristine myth,” which posited the region as the
First Eden and the kingdom of the “ecologically noble savage.”10 Research on Latin
America’s cultural landscapes “examines various views of nature and various historical
forces—” such as ideas, memories, and beliefs— “that shaped both environmental
change and human-environment interactions over time,” based on the assumption that the
region’s “different social groups at distinct times saw nature and landscape quite
differently.”11
The conceptual framework of this thesis also fits within the approach to the study
of longue duree environmental change based on ecological materialism proposed by
environmental historians such as Jason Moore. This framework roots the origins of the
contemporary global environmental crisis in the “transition to capitalism during the long
sixteenth century (1450- 1640),”12 a process that fed off the exploitation of commodity
frontiers such as silver, sugar, or, in the case of Panama, specialized transit. Across
spatial and temporal scales, this transition produced and intensified what Marx called a
“metabolic rift,” a “progressively deepening rupture in the nutrient cycling between the
country and the city.” In turn, this rift drove the need to secure new sources of cheap
labor and land to sustain capital accumulation, leading to “renewed and extended cycles

natural landscape, man [sic] expressing his place in nature as a distinct agent of modification.” Carl O.
Sauer, “The Morphology of Landscape,” (1925) in Land and Life; a Selection from the Writings of Carl
Ortwin Sauer, ed. John Leighly (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); 333.
10
Mark Carey, “Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends, Interdisciplinary Insights, and
Future Directions,” Environmental History 14 (2009), 233.
11
Ibid.
12
Jason W. Moore, “Environmental Crises and the Metabolic Rift in World-Historical Perspective,”
Organization & Environment 13, no. 2 (2000), 123.
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of unsustainable development on a world-scale.”13 Adopting the prisms of water history
and global social metabolism, this thesis will contextualize the radical transformation of a
particular river valley whose tragic ecological fate has been historically linked to
Panama’s history and, thus, with the isthmus’ traditional transit activity and its
corresponding relationship with nature and the world market.
The concept of social metabolism, a biological metaphor, proves fruitful for
contextualizing the human and non-human drivers of environmental change. The use of
metabolization as an explanatory analogy for collective human and network behavior
offers “a powerful unifying concept to relate the functioning of society to its
consequences upon the environment.” Highlighting the cultural importance of the study
of energy and material flows,14 the social metabolism framework forces researchers to
focus on the material and intellectual consequences of fluctuating flows of fuels,
nutrients, and capital. Despite its logical home in agricultural history, 15 urban
environmental history also benefits from the analytical depth opened by the category of
social metabolism, which enables a conceptualization of landscape and systemic
processes not only in terms of human agency, but “as manifestations of biotic interactions
between people and the land." 16 Revealing case studies and novel theoretical approaches

13

Jason W. Moore, “The Modern World-System as Environmental History? Ecology and the Rise of
Capitalism,” Theory and Society 32, no. 3 (2003), 309.
14
Marina Fischer-Kowalski, “Society’s Metabolism: The Intellectual History of Materials Flow Analysis, Part
I, 1860- 1970,” Journal of Industrial Ecology 2, no. 1 (1998), 61–78.
15
See for example Brett Clark and John Bellamy Foster, “Ecological Imperialism and the Global Metabolic
Rift: Unequal Exchange and the Guano/Nitrates Trade,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology
50, no. 3-4 (2009), 311– 334; Jason W. Moore, “The End of the Road? Agricultural Revolutions in the
Capitalist World-Ecology, 1450-2010,” Journal of Agrarian Change 10, no. 3 (2010), 389–413.
16
Metabolization as used in biological and ecological studies refers to “a summation of biological
reactions,” including “the processes by which raw materials from the environment are broken down, the
processes by which living cells and energy are produced as well as regulatory mechanisms.” See Alfred H.
Siemens, Patricia Moreno-Casasola, and Clorinda Sarabia Bueno, “The Metabolization of Dunes and
Wetlands by the City of Veracruz, Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Geography 5, no. 1 (2006), 7–29.
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to the study of the relation between colonial extraction – of raw materials, labor or
commodities – and changes in social metabolism and landscapes have been produced.17
The origins of Latin America’s environmental crises lie in the type and scale of
human interventions in the ecosystems of the past. The decision-making behind many of
the most significant modifications of landscape, organization of labor, and ecology in the
region’s history often took place outside of the continent. As Mark Carey puts it, the
“mode of production and the class structure of every place have been continually
determined from outside, by their incorporation and integration into global capitalism.”18
The exploitation of the Panama’s ‘geographic resource,’ a main driver of environmental
degradation, has adopted different facades and patterns of resource use over the centuries,
mirroring changing geopolitical and technological paradigms. The long history of humaninduced environmental change in central Pacific Panama, which has been the site of the
‘official’ interoceanic corridor for over 400 years, was marked by the interaction of
transnational forces and nature. Global agents of environmental change, such as
mercantilism and imperialism, came into friction with more localized ones, including
capital accumulation and the provision of a food and water supply for an ever changing
Panama City.
In Panamanian historiography, the main theoretical insights this paper borrows are
grounded on the work of two of Panama’s most influential historians. Alfredo Castillero
Calvo, who in the 1970s identified the country`s most persistent and salient longue durée,

17

Joan Martinez-Alier, “Marxism, Social Metabolism, and International Trade,” in Alf Hornborg, J.R.
McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier, eds., Rethinking Environmental History: World-System History and
Global Environmental Change (Lanham, Md.: Altamira Press, 2007), 221 – 38; Rebecca Clausen and Brett
Clark, “The Metabolic Rift and Marine Ecology: An Analysis of the Ocean Crisis Within Capitalist
Production,” Organization & Environment 18, no. 4 (2005), 422–44.
18
Carey, “Latin American Environmental History: Current Trends…,” 226.
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“transitismo” (transit-ism), to make sense of the complicated history of human behavior
on the isthmus. The concept helps elucidate the particular economic and social structures
resulting from the insertion of Panama into the emerging world market, following the
Spanish conquest in the early sixteenth century. Prior to the arrival of whites, indigenous
groups maintained several transisthmian corridors across the territory. However, the
Spanish established a monopolistic and centralized control over a single route linking
both world oceans, an arrangement that has persisted to the present-day—albeit in altered
forms. The formation of landscapes associated with colonial transit activity reinforced the
worldview of the local oligarchy, often a market-dominant minority connected to transit
activities. Besides the direct hegemony over the “geographic resource,” transitismo also
posits the underdevelopment of other productive activity due to the overreliance on the
transportation and service sectors of the economy.
Guillermo Castro Herrera has grappled with the main problems of Panama’s
environmental history in an effort to provide a historical perspective to the development
of a blueprint for national sustainable development. Castro Herrera applied Castillero’s
concept of transitismo to environmental history, examining its socioecological impact
over time, and tracing to it the origins of some of the most troubling problems and
contradictions of Latin American19 and Panama’s environmental history.20 Following
Donald Worster’s study of water control in the arid American West, Castro Herrera
fruitfully applied historian Karl Wittfogel’s theory of hydraulic empire to understand the
authoritarianisms suffered by Panama during the last century. Wittfogel’s thesis argued

19

Guillermo Castro Herrera, “The Environmental Crisis and the Tasks of History in Latin America,”
Environment and History 3, no. 1 (1997): 1–18.
20
Guillermo Castro Herrera, "Isthmus in the World: Elements for an Environmental History of Panama."
Global Environment 1 (2008): 10–55.
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that, in the context of ancient Chinese civilization, the Asiatic mode of production’s
reliance on large-scale irrigation works led to bureaucratic despotism and structural
ossification and, in turn, stymied movements originating from civil society and crushed
efforts at reform.21 Although the use of the theory of hydraulic despotism by Wittfogel
and Worster was mostly concerned with irrigation in agricultural societies, the theory, as
Castro Herrera shows with a case study of Panama, can be applied to any social or
government structure which maintains power and control through exclusive control over
access to water. Water serves as an economic mediator tying nation-states to their
resource base and material spaces.
Through the prism of a strategic river valley, this study attempts to examine the
relation between transitismo and environmental change over time in central Panama.
Entire landscapes that had performed an important role in forging Panamanians’ historic
identity disappeared due to the radical physical transformation entailed by the canal.22
Although the forces of nature posed great challenges for American engineers, this aspect
of the waterway’s history has been simplified under the traditional triumphalist narratives
explaining the canal’s history. Historical geographer Omar Jaén Suárez offers a
description of the environmental changes deriving from the combined impact that French
and American canal building had on central Panama’s ecosystems:
During almost 40 years of work in the central isthmus of Panama the most profound changes on the
natural environment were produced… the derivation of the Chagres river, the creation of 423 km 2
Gatun lake and the smaller Miraflores lake, the construction of dams and locks, the removal of
21

See Karl August Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; a Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1957); K. A Wittfogel, The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History
(Paris:Alcan, 1935).
22
Guillermo Castro Herrera, “PRO MUNDI BENEFICIO: Elementos para una Historia Ambiental de Panamá
II,” in Historia General de Panamá, ed. Alfredo Castillero Calvo (Panama City: Comité Nacional del
Centenario de la República de Panamá, 2004); 138.
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hundreds of millions of cubic meters of earth and rock from the future canal channels… the
landfills of Colon and Panama, the drainage of huge swamps, and the suppression of the Rio
Grande at the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal. 23

If one ponders the magnitude and pace of change in the isthmus during the long
nineteenth century, the pending task in Panama’s environmental history remains the need
to “resignify and reconstruct” these forgotten landscapes based on “chronicles, technical
documents, and literary works.”5 This thesis aims to contribute to this need by elucidating
the history of the spaces around the southern access channel of the Panama Canal. These
areas of Panama’s Pacific basin were completely altered and alienated from its rightful
inhabitants owing to the establishment of the Canal Zone. The Río Grande valley’s
devastation is representative and symbolic of one of the most important environmental
changes occurring within the transit region: the transformation of entire agricultural
landscapes associated with Panama’s urban areas into transit landscapes during the
construction of the U.S. controlled waterway and territory.24
The environmental history of Latin American rivers is still an emerging field.
Monographs on river histories are numerous in the environmental history literature of
other regions, a product of the rich window that the study of human-river relations opens
into the changing relationship between society and nature.25 Humans’ close relationship
to water, especially freshwater, has always encouraged locating settlements near reliable
sources. An interdisciplinary approach to water history, including rivers, enables a
23

Omar Jaén Suárez, La Población del Istmo de Panamá: Estudio de Geohistoria (Madrid: Ediciones de
Cultura Hispánica, 1998); 326.
24
Castro Herrera, “PRO MUNDI BENEFICIO,” 138.
25
For similar approaches see: Philip V. Scarpino, Great River: An Environmental History of the Upper
Mississippi, 1890-1950 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1985); Michael F. Logan, The
Lessening Stream : An Environmental History of the Santa Cruz River (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona
Press, 2002); and Evan R. Ward, Border Oasis : Water and the Political Ecology of the Colorado River Delta,
1940-1975 (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2003).
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synthesis of its co-evolution in relation to human history, incorporating insights from
fields such as cultural, economic, science and technology, social, political, and religious
history as well as drawing from other disciplines. As Hernán Lasso points out, with the
exception of Brazil, studies focusing on rivers as subjects of analysis have been scant in
the Latin American environmental historiography. Despite its abundance of freshwater
and generally well-watered territory, this type of research has not featured prominently in
the field’s literature, focusing more efforts at merging environmental history with other
historiographical currents such as: cultural history, social history, intellectual history, and
others.26 A global process of accumulation characterized by the conversion of natural into
financial capital accelerated after World War II, and Latin American rivers and
waterscapes were subjected to modernizing pressures. Developmentalist politicians
promoted public-works projects and intense dam-building. However, as the Panama
Canal’s case shows, there are precedents to large transformations of watersheds by
transnational capital and foreign interventions.
This examination of a Central American river basin strives to enrich the current
discussion about what the Canal Zone meant for the long-term structures of Panamanian
society. Beyond the canal’s similarities with the Suez Canal and other crucial straits
throughout the world,27 scholars have conceptualized the Panama Canal Zone as one of
many off-limits company towns of transnational capital that flourished throughout Latin
America during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Central Panama’s transit
region was the main, but not only, locus of the US federal government’s presence on the

26

Hugo Hernán Lasso Otaya, “Notes for the environmental history of Machángara River at Quito in the
twentieth century,” HALAC 2, vol. 4 (2015), 249.
27
In English, a critical treatment of the Suez Canal include D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez: The Suez
Canal in History, 1854- 1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
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isthmus during the twentieth century. The spaces of the Canal Zone, similar to the United
Fruit Company’s banana plantations or burgeoning US military base complex, were the
domain of absentee capitalist and imperialist logics which dictated land-use. This thesis
aims to enrich the literature on the environmental impacts of these neo-colonial ventures
on the world-system’s periphery, while highlighting the uniqueness of the quasi-military,
quasi-civilian Panama Canal Zone among neo-colonial enclaves in Latin America. This
thesis also strives to enrich Latin American environmental history’s ties to activism and
sustainability. This stance remains viable, and urgent, despite disciplinary criticisms of
presentism, culpability, “declensionism,” or accounts of progressive decline of the natural
world under human activity.28
In light of the impact of high population density on the quality of life in the transit
region, and the near completion of the Panama Canal Expansion Project which embodies
a continuation of resource use and political economic practices, 29 this thesis also intends
to illuminate the scale of the ‘urban.’ Greater Panama City’s modern environmental
history is inextricably linked to that of the canal and its changing political ecology of
water. The capital’s urban growth was ultimately shaped by the territorial restrictions
placed by the Canal Zone’s enclosure and, later, ecological ones following the
28
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establishment of an official, protected Canal Watershed area. A virtual straitjacket to any
organic urbanization, the spatial limits to Panama City’s expansion in the twentieth
century determined the landscapes created by geopolitical tension and bourgeois cultural
attitudes.30 The following narrative tracing the Río Grande valley’s history, through its
connectedness with the largest city on the shoreline of Panama Bay, serves as a local case
study of the planetary dynamic of agro-ecological metabolic rift proposed by Moore.
Panama’s interoceanic corridor’s problematic dialectic comprising glocal
sustainability and the legacies of unequal relationships with world markets and global
metabolism can be unpacked by its changing waterscapes, water uses, and fluvial
systems. The problematic interconnectedness of the canal's and the city's day to day
functioning – through the sharing of a common watershed31 for the distribution of water
for over half of Panama's national population, as well as huge volumes of freshwater for
the operation of the locks – has its origins in a convoluted process of environmental
change in the early twentieth century. Therefore, this thesis attempts to employ the
methodology of environmental history to further demonstrate how Panama’s dependency
on foreign powers and a one-dimensional productive apparatus altered social and cultural
paradigms, including Panamanians’ collective relationship to nature.

30
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Within the US environmental historiography, the questions at the center of this
thesis are a response to Paul Sutter’s grievance that “Environmental historians of the
United States have been slow to move beyond the nation’s borders to chart the
environmental implications of the United States as a hemispheric and global actor,” and
that “environment has only rarely been taken seriously as one of those material
dimensions shaping imperial power.”32 The irreversible consequences of Latin American
neo-colonialism for natural environments and resources, and the ecological footprint of
military bases33 and extractive enclaves, are increasingly seen as vital to larger
transnational and inter-disciplinary debates.
Despite its historical and logistical significance to the canal, David McCullough’s
bestseller, The Path Between the Seas, only mentions the Rio Grande sparingly and fails
to recognize the importance of its transformation. McCullough refers to it only as a
“noisy narrow torrent winding along through dense forests below the track,”34 paralleling
the Panama Railroad finished in 1855. The only detailed scholarly treatment of the Rio
Grande’s history is included in the first chapter of Eduardo Tejeira Davis’s architectural
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and planning history of Ciudad del Saber (City of Knowledge), 35 a research and
development complex established in a reverted and repurposed U.S. military based built
in 1919 on a riverbank of the Rio Grande. Tejeira Davis notes that the only geographical
feature that remains intact in the area is the Rio Cardenas, a tributary of the Rio Grande
that joined the basin’s main river north of Panama City.36 This thesis will build upon
Tejeira Davis’s work to provide a more comprehensive environmental perspective of the
river’s history, drawing from diverse fields such as Latin American, U.S., and science
and technology historiographies.
Panama Canal connected river ecosystems that had been separated for
evolutionary eras. Understanding the spread of species spatially along the Panama Canal,
for instance, requires a diachronic picture of the area prior to its construction. The
reorganization of the environment generated a species mix that is hard to gauge without a
historical perspective.37 The immediate environmental consequences of uniting the
world’s oceans through the linking of isthmian rivers have fascinated scientists for
decades.38 A recent study of invasive species in the Panama Canal Watershed compared
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the species make-up of the two distinct river basins that were welded together into one in
the early twentieth century: the Río Chagres and the Río Grande.39
Although some of the towns named after its tributaries survive, and the
headwaters of some of its feeders remain alive, the river has diluted from collective
memory. Nonetheless, the latest stage in the history of the interoceanic corridor across
central Panama has endured to our days, and its materiality has had the greatest
environmental impact upon the Rio Grande. Therefore, this narrative will favor the early
twentieth century because the rate of morphological and social change in the region
accelerated dramatically during this period, just after the end of the Thousand Days’ War
in 1902, and left an important imprint on the transit landscapes and waterscapes of the
twenty-first century.
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NATURAL HISTORY AND PRE-COLUMBIAN CORRIDOR

From jutting peninsulas to island continents, our planet boasts some unique land
formations. Among these workings of the earth’s inner layers, the isthmus of Panama is
unique. The area of southern Central America is subject to the interaction of five different
tectonic plates, with three of these meeting at two separate junctures, accounting for a
volatile and complex geologic zone. After the breakup of Pangea, the landmasses of
North America and South America were isolated from each other. These spatial
differences are crucial to understanding why human schemes to link both the Atlantic and
Pacific have historically concentrated in central Panama and, more importantly, how
nature has shaped these interoceanic ventures. “The geographical position of Panama and
its diverse historical circumstances,” as Carlos Malgrat asserted, “constitutes the principal
cause of the existence of diverse groups of humans on the isthmus.”40
About 65 million years ago, between the two Americas lay a series of islands of
volcanic origin which would later be called Costa Rica and western Panama. Gradually, a
sill41 one thousand meters underwater formed between the two oceans. This deposit of
volcanic material already contained the bedrock of what would comprise the future transit
region.42 Caused at least in part by a growth spurt in the Antarctic ice sheet decreasing
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sea levels, the sill became an archipelago due to the uplift of the isthmus and differences
in elevation across its extension. The land barrier between the oceans completely rose
above water between three and six million years ago. During recent geologic time, the
Pacific coastal waters were fifty meters below current levels; an important portion of
today’s Panama Bay was coastal plain featuring hills whose peaks constitute today’s
offshore islands.
The formation of the isthmus altered the very dynamics of the earth. Rather than a
sudden emergence, this was a protracted process that produced the unique geological mix
of terrains in the center of the isthmus. The formation of the barrier between the oceans
isolated two distinct coastal ecosystems. This allowed for separate and distinct natural
histories to develop, resulting in different coastal geographies along both shorelines. The
isthmus obstructed an ancient current of water, known as the Tropical American Seaway,
and diverted it northward, creating the Gulf Stream. The trade winds, which blow from
northeast to southwest through Panama, faced a new obstacle that forced them to blow
between new mountain passes, resulting in a patchwork of drought-prone regions in the
Pacific basin.
Eons before it became a crossroads between human realms, the isthmus formed “a
land bridge over which inhabitants of each America invaded each other —the so-called
Great American Biotic Interchange.”43 These invasions transformed the terrestrial flora
and fauna of two continental ecosystems. The natural nexus provided the structural
opportunities for mobile species eager to colonize higher or lower latitudes. The forests
of southern Central America evolved, from resembling those of the present day Southern
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United States, to looking more like their South American counterparts. This interchange
also altered plant and animal assemblages of the land bridge that enabled it, creating the
base for the eclectic biodiversity that survives today. In 2005, a study estimated that sixty
percent of tree species in central Panama (433 species!) traced their origins to crossAndean or Amazon basin ecosystems.44 Endemic animals, mostly grazers like giant and
regular sloths but also forest dwellers like raccoons, took advantage of the isthmus`
“mosaic of plant communities” to reach South and North America, while altering the land
bridge’s landscape on their way. The records of migrations and pollen recordings point
towards a persistent, evolving evergreen forest cover – albeit with stretches of grassland –
that acted as a “filter for species,” accounting for its rich biodiversity.45
Accidents of geology and the fluctuations of the climate system endowed Panama
with unequaled natural attributes favoring human settlement. Wind and ocean circulation
dynamics create hurricanes that scourge the belt running from Costa Rica to Yucatan
with brutal regularity.46 The climate system interaction with the earth’s rotation produces
a particularity in this area known as the Coriolis Effect,47 causing hurricanes to deviate
just north of modern Panama in the Intertropical Convergence Zone. Much of Panama is
thus protected from infamous Caribbean hurricanes.
A volcanic arc that originates in Mexico ends in El Valle, located close to the
center of the modern republic of Panama, but far enough from what would become the
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transit area. These same “buckling forces” account for the earthquake belt running from
western Panama into Mexico, again sparing the eastern half of today’s Panama.48
The nature of Panama’s coastal landforms, comprising an elevated percentage in
this Central American case, illustrate the traditional geomorphologies of fluvial lowlands.
Coastal plain river valleys commonly include meandering rivers with relatively broad
floodplains. Rivers are important components of coastal plain settings, as Paul Hudson
explains, “their alignment and orientation playing a determinant role in the structure and
form of a 'subtle' landscape.”49 Due to the nature of the physical structure of Central
America’s isthmus and the ecosystems of the narrowest area with close, transoceanic
basins, the rivers of Panama are uniquely important for the region’s physical and human
geographies.
The isthmus’s rivers tend to snake down its slopes carrying thick, chocolate
waters and ending in big, littoral swamps. Their waters dye the Pacific and Caribbean
coasts with their yellow, sepia, pink and muddy green color.50 The Caribbean slope, due
to the proximity of the cordillera, is generally drained by shorter and more torrential
rivers than the Pacific basin. The Pacific slope’s coastal plain, comprised of fertile but
easily eroded soils, is drained by more linear rivers that fluctuate dramatically with the
uncertain precipitation patterns that plague the area’s monsoon-based climate.
In East-Central Panama, henceforth called the transit region, both oceans are
separated by less than 100 kilometers of land that, for the most part, does not exceed 25
meters above sea level. However, the Caribbean and Pacific coastal and inland
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ecosystems are significantly different. Both slopes boasted portions of mangrove and
different types of coral reefs. The belt that comprises the transit region was mostly
covered by tropical rainforest, except for a narrow stretch of grassland along the Pacific
coast. In this area, the cordillera dwindles down to an assemblage of short hills before
regaining mountainous height towards Darien. This series of hillslopes and intervening
valleys comprise the basin of the Río Chagres and the relatively meager Rio Grande.
Historian of the construction period of the Panama Railroad, Joseph Scott, claims that:
“The configuration of these almost-connecting river valleys had made them a trade route
across the isthmus since the earliest times.”51
Human groups constituted an isthmian civilization long before the conquest of the
early Spanish Main, the process by which these peoples were incorporated into Iberian
mainland coastal possessions surrounding the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.
These groups had distinct adaptations to their tropical environments and understanding
these features can enable a partial reconstruction of their settlements in the Rio Grande
basin. It is important to note that groups on both sides of the drainage divide traded
products that were unique to their ecosystems52; thus, interoceanic communication was a
lived experience of early isthmian civilization. The Río Chagres on the Caribbean and the
Pacific Rio Grande probably served as cogs of a transisthmian route, located on that
“narrow strip of land which has long served as the primary passage between the
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oceans.”53 However, there were several other routes coexisting with the Chagres route
across the isthmian region.54
Due to general human preferences, the drier Pacific slope was more densely
populated than the wetter Caribbean. In central Panama, the continental divide is close to
the southern shore of the isthmus, and the slope is thus “very steep and whatever water
falls runs away almost immediately.”55 For at least 2000 years before the Conquest, since
the late Neolithic period, densely populated settlements in the Pacific basin were found
mostly on alluvial plains. The units of organization, Cacicazgos, were organized around
the area’s rivers which generally run from North to South, and these territories generally
paralleled their vertical orientations.56 The use of fire in agriculture and hunting was
commonplace, and the anthropic savannas of the Pacific basin attest to this fact.57

53

Stanley Heckadon Moreno, “Impact of Development on the Panama Canal Environment,” Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 35, n. 3 (1993), 132.
54
Guillermo Castro Herrera, “Panama, un Territorio en Tres Tiempos,” HALAC 3, n. 1 (2014), 145 – 146.
55
Charles Marsh, “Report on fresh-water copepoda from Panama, with descriptions of new
species,” Smithsonian Misc. Collections 61 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1913).
56
Ibid., 147.
57
In fact, few patches of old growth forest remain in the transit region. Most of the present-day Canal
Watershed’s protective forests are new growth dating to the colonial period.

25

THE CASTILLIAN CORRIDOR

During the early stages of the conquest, the Spaniards were looking for an
interoceanic passage through the Spanish Main. The establishment of Panama City, the
first European-founded settlement on the Pacific, was determined by the immediate
imperatives and logic of securing a colonial outpost. The site was chosen because it could
function as the southern node within a strategic axis of settlements that provided the
orientation for the initial territorial organization of the isthmus. A surrounding miasmatic
environment, being flanked by mangroves and swamps on both sides, compounded the
lack of nearby sources of potable water. Being by necessity established in Panama Bay,
the sites of Old Panama and its successor58 did boast harbors that were usable. Following
a fire which consumed the original settlement during the invasion and sacking by Welsh
pirate Henry Morgan, Panamá was moved a few miles westward, closer to the mouth of
the Rio Grande.
The colonial core of the city was relocated in the Ancón area, the vicinity of the
200 meter elevation overlooking the city that dominated the landscape of the lower Rio
Grande. Castillero Calvo notes that the site was called ‘Ancón’ because of the existence
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of two ‘ancones’ or, following the Castillian term, two anchorable harbors.59 One of these
was the mouth of the Rio Grande.
The historic Rio Grande basin, covering approximately 85 square miles, could host
about three hundred homesteads. Traditionally, the fluvial lowlands were inhabited by
peoples working annual swiddens of maize, sugar mills, and stock of cattle and pigs.
Their surplus was carried downriver aboard canoes to be sold in Panama City.60 During
the rainy season, the streams of the Pacific basin frequently interrupted land travel across
the savannahs along Panama’s Pacific coast. In the dry season, their stream-like trickle
rendered them generally unnavigable. Despite great seasonal variability, the river was
embedded within a production and distribution system of local food, and its role was
heightened due to the general geography of the Pacific basin and the regional
concentration of the isthmus’s population ultimately controlled by the Crown.
The earliest description of the river remains that of Diego Ruiz de Campo, a
seventeenth century explorer who described the hinterland of Panama City as follows:
“A fourth of a legua from the Cerro Ancon towards the west there is an inlet that has beaches on
both banks and has as a whole a third of a legua in width, said inlet is completely open to the south
and in its middle drains that mouth of the rio Grande that takes the whole length, and at the
entrance of said river lies a flat islet full of mangroves without there being any tree of benefit and
said islet is swampy which makes the river have two channels in its mouth and the one on the right
is more anchorable and [boats] can enter and boats go up with the tide to carry lime, honey, maize,
plantains and other things that lie upriver which is covered by tall mangroves on both flanks that
are of no benefit for anything […]”61
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Directly off the coast from the mouth of the Rio Grande lie four islands, the main
ones being Naos, Flamenco, and Perico. Due to Panama Bay’s wide tidal range, the
islands served as early harbors since the early sixteenth century. In 1591, Spanish
engineers Juan de Tejada and Juan B. Antonelli proposed moving the city to the bank of
the Rio Grande, owing mainly to its “handsome savannah” environments and its location
just a half legua away from the port at Perico.62 The Spanish military engineer, Nicolás
Rodriguez, produced a map in 1735 that traced the two transisthmian routes sponsored by
the Crown, the Cruces and Gorgona trails, with detailed hydrologic features. 63 The map
shows a labeled Rio Grande, the names of its tributaries Rio Cárdenas and Caimitillo, and
the topography surrounding the paths.
The traditional narrative about the selection of the site of what would become
Panama City includes mention of the area’s scant water resources. The water portfolio
was poor, and depended on riverine and underground sources to even meet the
populations’ needs.64 Nearby streams served as workplaces for washerwomen and for
individuals dedicated to gathering water and selling it in towns. The natural environment
in the area did not have hydrological features benefitting urban dense settlement, but the
imperatives of empire-building and exploration made the location permanent.
With the arrival of the Spanish and the decimation of native nations, transitismo
emerged as the specific way of insertion of the isthmus into sixteenth century
transnational networks and as the dominant paradigm of economic mercantilism on the

62

Jean-Pierre Tardieu, Cimarrones de Panamá, 205.
Archivo General de Indias, Sevilla, sign. MP Panamá 137, reproduced in Tejeira Davis, Ciudad del Saber:
Un Legado en Construcción, 13.
64
Today, this narrative is reinforced by the current hydrologic landscape of the capital’s metropolitan
area, which features severely degraded urban streams and nearby rivers suffering from pollution and the
uncertainties of climate change.
63

28

ground. Transitismo established a central axis of organization with an East to West
direction, colonizing a savannah interior with cattle ranches in order to maintain the flow
of bullion and biomass across the transit region. Through the majority of the colonial era,
Panama functioned as a land bridge where merchants congregated at its termini from pain
and America to barter and peddle their goods. This was a vital part of the Spanish
imperial fleet and fair system, and dominated the colony’s rent-producing activities.
The society that took root in what today is known as Panama was controlled by
elements of a mercantile-oriented oligarchy. These sectors quickly accumulated some
wealth deriving from their relationship with imperial transisthmian traffic. They
dominated the tertiary apparatus articulated to Spain’s monopolistic control of the
transisthmian route including ownership of storehouses for Incan silver, following
Francisco Pizarro’s conquest, and other transit-related activities, such as the importation
and reexportation of African slaves to other Spanish possessions in the Pacific. Around
the middle of the sixteenth century, the incorporation of Peru into new mercantile
networks brought about the articulation of the savannah hinterland of Panama City to the
transit economy.65 This connection was brought forth as a spatial byproduct of decisionmaking over land-use by a mercantile and landowning elite, the ruling class of the
isthmus’s socio-economic formation based on slavery and dependent on livestock, a land
gobbling economic enterprise, onto the tropical lowlands of the Pacific coast.66
The demographic and political transition that the isthmus underwent during the
sixteenth century left its mark in the Rio Grande valley. There are records of at least one
65
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reduccion, an artificial indian settlement established by the Spanish to control and exploit
a previously scattered native labor force, being founded along its tributaries in 1581.
These settlements were somewhat different in Panama due to the high and precocious
number of African slaves, which were ‘reduced’ alongside surviving natives. Central
America was one of the areas of the New World worst hit by the decimation of
indigenous populations, with estimates positing a 90% mortality in the isthmus.
The human and physical geographies of the isthmus posed challenges for the
integration of Panama City with its hinterland. The seasonal streams carved in the Pacific
obstructed East-West travel, hindering transportation of people and goods into the city.67
The establishment of Spanish villas, especially those at the termini of the transithmian
corridor, enabled the conquest of vast areas for cattle grazing. However, large areas
remained as frontiers due to hostile indigenous settlements and impenetrable forests (such
as the mighty Darien to the East and Bocas del Toro, famous for its more recent history
as a banana and later eco-tourism locale). Despite the prodigious availability of cattle
and the fact that dried beef, cattle lard, and skins was exported during the colonial era, the
Panamanian diet suffered shortages that exacerbated whenever rumors of pirate attacks
swirled.68 Flat field agriculture and plowing methods did not thrive in the isthmus, and
Panama became the only Latin American country where rice was as common as maize.
The few plantations established on the isthmus produced sugar cane and cotton, but most
cultivated land was worked by small producers of coffee, mangoes, cacao, plantains, and
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bananas. By the late colonial period, pasture occupied more land than crops, supporting
close to 193 000 heads of cattle, but still 93% of the land was forested.69
The colonial interoceanic route was usually a combination of overland and fluvial
segments, and the corridor could not be traversed in fewer than four days, or more
depending on weather conditions. The most important route depended on mules brought
from stables in Central America and African slaves that drove the mule trains. Loaded
with silver, these mules required large quantities of maize to work. The functioning of
this early isthmian route, that in the Pacific slope ran parallel to the Rio Grande, enabled
Europe to develop the so-called original accumulation, as the huge flow of precious
metals from South America to Spain via Panama played a critical role in the monetization
necessary to create a modern market economy. The exploitation of Panama’s geographic
resource during the initial period of an interoceanic corridor connected to the emerging
world system depended wholly on human and animal energy: African muleteers and
bogas provided transportation services by providing smooth interoceanic passages for
both local and foreign masters.
Transisthmian transit was extremely dependent on local conditions, from
microclimates in both basins to the ability to control a labor force. The subjugation of
Indians and African slaves was essential for the urban elite to profit from the transit
enterprise. The isthmus’ rivers and their valleys were central in this corridor. Producing
food to feed transit workers and pack mules was also a need that had to be addressed
locally.

The mercantile-oriented oligarchs turned strongly to cattle raising in the

anthropic savannahs of the capital’s hinterland, establishing the defining characteristic of
Panamanian food systems. Pedro Arias Davila, the first governor of Panama City,
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introduced 50 heads of cattle from his hacienda in Jamaica, providing the stock for future
cattle economies from Nicaragua to Peru. As Castro Herrera puts it, “this was largely
possible because cattle found an exceptionally favorable niche in the savannahs that the
aboriginal population had created over the previous 2,000 years, mainly in the central and
western plains of the Pacific basin of the Isthmus.”70
The animal protein that was raised in the countryside served to feed transit
workers whose labor was coerced for imperial transportation rather than agricultural or
other extractivist production. Besides its intrinsic relationship to the Spanish treasure fleet
through its sustaining foodstuffs, cattle raising presented clear benefits as a supporting
economic activity in this colonial outpost on the edge of European civilization: the
colonizing of ecosystems through conversion of land to pasture, exclusive resource use
through land titling reinforced the privilege of whiteness in Spanish Panama, the
superabundance of cattle afforded a degree of food security in the transit region, cattle
corpses produced important market products including tallow and fiber-like products, and
livestock functioned as a mobile bank account in drought-prone central Pacific Panama.
The grasslands of the Pacific slope’s coastal plain were a combination of natural
and anthropic savannahs. The most common grasses included a stable assemblage of
drought-tolerating species which, until the middle of the nineteenth century, included:
broad stalkgrass (e.g. Pharos latifolius), Arundinella deppeana, and Trasya sp. The most
important weed of the savannah was Mimosa pudica. Historically, the savannahs of the
Pacific basin were not continuous, but were interrupted by gallery forests flanking the
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streams.71 This mosaic of environments, a vast brushland savannah laced with riparian
woodlands, persisted especially up to the nineteenth century. The area between the last
coastal plains and mouth of the Rio Grande and Old Panama was under pasture since
before the destruction of Old Panama.
Boom and bust cycles of economic bonanza defined Panama’s economy and the
metabolism of available natural and human resources. The geographic resource became
fetishized under the ideology of transitismo, and its logic guided official land-use patterns
far beyond the transit region during the colonial era. Despite fluctuations in transit
activity throughout the colonial period, population never rose above 1500 inhabitants
dependent on agriculture and the transport of passenger and cargo, by mule and small
boat, across the isthmus.72 The cattle-based economies of the rest of the Pacific slope,
extending into the lowlands of the Azuero Peninsula and further even to modern-day
Chiriqui province, had particular ecological effects on their native landscapes. The
problems of deforestation, land monopolies, soil depletion, and erosion associated with
the cattle centered agrarian activity in Panama need to be understood in relation to
transitismo’s demand for resources far beyond the transit region.
The transit landscapes associated with the early imperial routes, the so-called
Cruces and Gorgona trails, were the result of a strictly controlled route handling low
intensity commodity flows. The “preindustrial transit,” flowing from 1550 to 1850, was
financed by domestic capital and fueled by slave or peon labor. The technology enabling
the first capitalist iteration of the transoceanic corridor --- stone trails, mules, feed, and
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small settlements at river crossings --- was “adapted to the restrictions of the
environment” and this arrangement persisted beyond independence of 1821.73
In 1827, John A. Lloyd, Simon Bolivar’s envoy to Panama to determine the best
route for a road or a canal, described the Rio Grande as “emerging close to a hill called
Pedro Miguel, and becoming navigable for large canoes as it receives several creeks.”74
Lloyd also calls attention to the sandbank blocking the mouth of the river, two miles west
of Panama City, attributing this feature to the low tide of the Bay dropping below two
feet at the entrance.
The decision-making pertaining to interoceanic transit across the isthmus of
Panama was mostly located outside of the isthmus. However, human agency was exerted
on the ground – albeit unequally – following colonial and republican Latin America’s
patterns of governance. At this point it would be helpful to understand the worldview of
Panamanian elites who have collaborated in establishing and perpetuating transitismo
since the sixteenth century and, thus, have shaped the range of relations possible between
humans and the Rio Grande basin.
The evident incapacity of the New Granada’s establishment to adequately manage
the transisthmian transit in the conditions of world trade emerging in the mid-nineteenth
century fed the isthmus’ elites reasons to envision a different relation to the world
market. Mariano Arosemena, one of Panama’s leading intellectuals during the first half of
the nineteenth century, argued that if Panama was to exploit its maritime potential it
needed more contact with North Atlantic societies and more freedom from the influence
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of conservative Bogota.75 Panama’s majority black population, which was becoming
increasingly organized and incorporated into republican life, added to elite concerns
about sustained prosperity. Although Panama never developed an intensive exportoriented plantation economy, the transit economy and the transit region’s role in Spanish
America perpetuated a population dominated by slaves and free people of color. In part
as a strategy for legitimizing their power and to avert an uprising evoking Haiti’s
revolution, Arosemena explains that “We [elites] occupied ourselves with proposing
laws… that were necessary for the growth of intermaritime traffic.”76
Panama’s white ruling class formulated a new blueprint for the future: a
“Hanseatic project.” In the mid-nineteenth century, the term comunicación, or
communication, was a term used regularly by Panamanian thinkers to denote the
“circulation of goods, people, and information from one point of the planet to another.”
For these writers, the concept of sovereignty, or “soberanía,” was primarily concerned
with “the organization and enactment of power over territory and flows of people,
information and goods through governmental and extra-governmental means.”77 The
oligarchy espoused an ideology that did not leave room for the development of
productive forces not directly related to their concept of communication as production.
Their vision entailed perpetual dependence on international transit and close
interaction with white foreigners. The internationalizing bent of this precursor of the
modern globalization ideal was to transform Panama into an “emporium of universal
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commerce.”78 The so-called anseatista movement proposed that Panama, like the
Hanseatic ports of Baltic maritime trade, should enjoy special status as a free-trade zone:
managing its own affairs but protected by one or more major maritime powers. Despite
conflicting cultures of nature co-existing in the Panamanian territory, urban and transitdependent elites consolidated control upon the larger society’s relationship to the
interoceanic environment. Arosemena, for example, envisioned the anticipated entry of
the interoceanic corridor into the industrial age.79 In 1824, the writer and businessman
specified the ideal conditions of the exploitation of the isthmus’ geographic resource,
demanding it materialized as a fluvial route, as opposed to rumors about possible
railways, traversing the historic transit region and uniting the Río Chagres and Rio
Grande.80
Nonetheless, the rising political ambitions of creole lawmakers did not have a
significant impact on des-accelerating transoceanic flows, which had been in decline
since the early eighteenth century. The duration of the transit across the isthmus
continued to be highly contingent, dependent on the availability of transport, weather
conditions, and other factors. Historian Aims McGuinness provides a snapshot of the late
days of the ancient route:
“[The corridor] was controlled and operated by a distinct group of workers, many of whom were
also proprietors of the means of transport, including mules and dugout canoes known as bongos.
The waters in the harbors at Chagres [Caribbean port] and Panama City were too shallow to permit
oceangoing ships to draw close to shore, and so arriving ships were forced to anchor as far as a
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mile off the coast. Local boatmen provided transportation from ship to ship using bongos or small
sailboats. People arriving at the port of Chagres continued up the Chagres River in bongos to the
town of Gatun or, if waters permitted, to the town of Cruces. Passengers either walked the rest of
the way or, more commonly, negotiated with still other local men for transportation by mule.
Travelers also had the option of hiring porters, or ‘cargadores,’ who carried cargo and sometimes
passengers on their backs using harnesses.” 81

The demands of the local oligarchy for a return to the days of the isthmus serving as an
imperial route were ultimately fruitful. While Simon Bolivar could not realize his dream
of Panama becoming the articulating joint of a united continent, during the second-half of
the nineteenth century, the growing power of transnational capital would reassert its will
upon landscapes of the neo-tropics. The changing material culture of western society
brought about an unavoidable juncture of change for the Colombian state of Panama.
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THE RAILROAD YEARS

Starting in the late eighteenth century, an expanding world market created the
conditions for the mechanization of production, transportation, and communication in the
Old World. The harnessing of novel energy sources increased the calculus of profitability
for the capitalist classes in North Atlantic countries. Stephen Bunker claims that “it was
not until the nineteenth century that the technologies developed and the capital
accumulated in industrial production fed back into the rapid advances in fossil fuel-driven
transport, in steel constructed vessels, and frames on steel constructed infrastructure.”82
This explosion in production generated the conditions for a new wave of capital
accumulation and population growth, which defined the era of industrial capitalism as
much as did the mechanization of production. New technologies ushered in new relations
of production and resource use. Moreover, the new system also signaled a paradigm shift
in human relations with nature, altering traditional, culture and place-specific balances.
Industrial capitalism depended on a worldview that reduced non-human nature to its
productive moment, treating it as a reservoir of commodities.83
Operating within this conception of nature, Adam Smith asserted that the wealth
of a nation lies in its ability to produce. David Ricardo extolled the virtues of local
specialization to engage in competitive, global markets. However, it is doubtful whether
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they had in mind the type of specialization and production that would be established and
perpetuated in Panama during the nineteenth century. The area's one-dimensional
economy and dependence on transit was maintained by blatantly oppressive structures of
power such as slavery and socially constructed food scarcity. New transportation
techniques and navigation routes stimulated maritime traffic that bypassed the isthmus.
Panama’s elites were unable to maintain the logistical relevance of the transit region and
navigate the grander changes.
A transnational transformation in the material conditions of transportation in
general would eventually lead to a revaluation of the isthmus in a changing context. Prior
to the emergence of modern transportation technologies, following Immanuel
Wallerstein, “long-distance transfers were generally restricted to preciosities (high value,
low bulk commodities),” such as silver, spices, and ivory. The extraction of these
commodities had significant negative ecological consequences in the colonies, but their
consumption only had a “slight significance for the metabolism of the core.” The midnineteenth century saw the “long-distance exchange of bulk commodities… become
crucial to the metabolism of some importing countries in Europe.”84 The growing
interconnection between states not only allowed raw materials and commodities to flow,
but also “increased the mass of matter and energy transformed by industry,” while at the
same time intensifying the world-system’s “inherent tendencies to spatial
concentration.”85
In this context of unequal and combined development, the consolidation of the
periphery-status of many of the world’s regions, such as Latin America where liberal
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republicanism stood as a shoddy façade, defined the direction of flows of this new world
system. New technologies ushered in a new stage in human-nature relations in European
societies and their diasporas throughout the world. New mechanistic attitudes toward
nature coincided with imperialistic social attitudes held by decision-making elites. These
patterns of imperial behavior had grave implications for the political ecology of the
isthmus due to its close proximity to a burgeoning U.S. “Panama would no longer be the
isthmus of Seville, Cadiz, or even Jamaica,” Jaen Suarez explains, “The North Atlantic
powers would rapidly succeed them. Panama would become the isthmus of New York.”86
Throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S. continued to march west following its
imperial banner of Manifest Destiny, continuing a federally-led, violent spatial expansion
and territorial dispossession of indigenous lands. This westward migration can be
understood as a micro-globalization in its own right, a safety-valve to deflate mounting
regional tensions over slavery and ensure uninterrupted profits to its capitalist class. The
imposition of the U.S. dollar as a universal, gold-backed currency over the vast territory
was only accomplished due to the growth of the central government during this period.
The discovery of gold in California in 1848 created a pull factor for get-rich quick
oriented masses of different origins. Multiple paths across Central America started to
figure in the American imaginary as routes to reach the west coast of the U.S. Panama
was chosen over a Nicaragua to provide a railroad link for maritime passengers. A
tortuous overland route across the American Great Plains and West highlighted the
Panama option as a safer, more convenient way to shorten the trek. The availability of
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steamships, which appeared on the Pacific following the annexation of Oregon in 1847,87
meant that currents or traditional sailing ills no longer conditioned navigation to the same
degree. Besides being the de-facto path for fortune-seeking migrants, the route that
developed was also exploited by Pacific South American countries to cheapen their
shipping costs to Europe and the Caribbean.
Efforts to build an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua and the geopolitical
paradigm at the time resulted in the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer treaty between the U.S. and
Great Britain, compelling both countries not to occupy, fortify, colonize, or otherwise
exercise domination over Central America. Although there were no Latin American
signatories to the treaty, the construction of an interoceanic canal or railway by foreign
capital was effectively prohibited in the region. The failure of the Colombian capitalist
class to muster enough capital meant that a national venture could not be launched to
renew the interoceanic corridor in any form.
The liberal and modernizing outlook of many Latin American elites enabled
American capital to become a major agent of landscape and social change. The early
industrial revolution in the US had generated extreme concentrations of capital in a few
hands, and these assets became increasingly important in regional diplomacy. In 1846,
the Mallarino-Bidlack treaty between New Granada and the US granted rights of way
across the isthmus to the US. An American corporation, the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company, won a bid and was awarded a land monopoly to construct a railroad. The
director of Pacific Mail, William H. Aspinwall, was one of these outward-looking barons,

87

John Haskell Kemble, The Panama Route, 1843 – 1869 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1943),
143.

41

and would promote the Panama Railroad Company as the chief organizer of the
construction of the railroad line from 1850 to 1855.
Following the collapse of the Spanish fleet and fair system in 1739, the
interoceanic route had fallen into disuse and relative neglect. As historian Aims
McGuiness writes, “transportation across Panama at the beginning of the gold rush was
still highly decentralized.”88 The early gold-rush conveyance of immigrants, gold, and
letters from the U.S. across the transit region was controlled by small operators with at
most a few mules or bongos. Due to the demand for rapid transportation and the archaic
infrastructure, McGuiness notes that from 1848 to 1852, the history of Panama’s transit
system was marked by the transformation “from a locally controlled network powered
primarily by human beings, mules, currents, and the wind to a more centralized and
largely US- owned ships and locomotives powered by steam.”89
However, the takeover of interoceanic communication in the transit region was
not completed overnight. The railroad technocratic elite first had to “wrest control of
Panama’s transit system from the boatmen, muleteers, washerwomen, and others in
Panama who also saw the potential to profit from the great migration to the goldfields.”90
But instead of just a social reorganization of labor associated with the route, the railroad
entailed a limited transformation of landscapes in the transit region to better adapt its
environs integrally to the new flow. Aspinwall’s plans included the construction of a
whole new terminal town on the Caribbean coast. The modern city of Colon,91 located on
a peninsula on Limon Bay west of Portobelo, traces its origins to this perceived need.
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Due to the abundant rainfall of the Caribbean slope, its lowland soils were saturated with
water. The need for construction material put pressure on the transit region’s mangroves.
On the Caribbean side of the railroad, its terminal and course were to be located in
swamp territory, requiring the first ever large-scale filling of wetlands in the isthmus.
The city of Colon did not attain considerable population size until the midtwentieth century,92 but its establishment along an almost straight line from Panama City
was necessary for the railroad’s effective annihilation of space through time. Panama
City, where mule trains were laden in the plaza during the Spanish years, remained the
Pacific terminal and “was dramatically transformed into a crowded place of frenzied
commerce and breathless anticipation.”93 Although at the time it was not much more than
an isolated Pacific outpost due to the decline in importance of the transit region, it
quickly became a cosmopolitan center where varied travelers congregated while waiting
for their steamer for San Francisco.
A restive state of social metabolism yielded to the vicissitudes of transnational
capital, which summoned boiler iron bridges, culverts, and trestles to the transit region’s
landscape and waterscapes. The company was given a great amount of land to use for the
route. Implementing the company’s vision required the migration of a transnational labor
force – including “coolies,” Irishmen, Jamaicans, among others – who fell at a 50-80%
mortality rate during the construction period.94 The construction of the interoceanic
railroad was a monumental task for its time, and required new forms of social and labor
organization. The environment posed vexing engineering challenges, as the tracks passed
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over mountains and through former wetlands. Over 300 bridges and culverts were
constructed along the route, representing a significant intervention in local ecosystems.
Besides the astronomical death rate and hideous working conditions, the railway’s
completion was further complicated by the fact that most woods rotted in this climate and
thus did not make good material for tiles. While the ballasting for the tracks was
completed throughout the entire line of the road, the spruce, pine, and native wood ties
decayed rapidly.95 It was not until the discovery of the properties of the black guayacum
(Lignum vitae) that the builders obtained a tropical hardwood with the necessary strength,
toughness, and density to overcome the heat and humidity. The logs were brought from
Colombia, and their formidable hardness meant that construction required drilling the ties
before the spikes could be nailed.96
Construction of the railroad’s Atlantic section had to contend with the obstacles
posed by the tortuous Rio Chagres. George Muirson Totten, chief engineer of the project,
complained about the area where the Rio Chagres’ tributaries ran closer to the “upper part
of the Rio Grande” which “presented a wild, broken country, with sharp projecting hills,
and deep ravines.” The cuts in this area “contained large quantities of rock.” Nonetheless,
the Pacific section builders found an ally in the Rio Grande valley. Muirson Totten
moves from a lengthy account of how the line traversed the Caribbean slope to describing
its course across the continental divide to the Pacific:
The line passes the summit ridge by a cut one quarter of a mile in length, and twenty-four feet in
greatest depth; and then strikes the head-waters of the Rio Grande…. Following the left bank of
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this stream… the line crosses the Rivers Pedro Miguel, Caimitillo, and Cardenas, near their
entrance into the Rio Grande; thence it stretches across the Savannas of Corasal [sic], and the
swamps of Corendu [sic], and cuts through the spur of the hill Ancon… reach[ing] the Pacific
Ocean at Playa Prieta, in the northern suburb of the city of Panama. 97

Moreover, he claims that “From the crossing of Pedro Miguel to the Pacific Terminus,
the work was generally of a light character—the line being down upon the river flats.”98
The Panama Railroad’s selected route, almost paralleling the colonial mule roads
leading to the fluvial port in the Rio Chagres, meant that, as Tejeira Davis explains, the
Rio Grande stopped being a “backwater” to the human flows of the transit region.99 The
colonial routes were always separated by swamps from the river, but the facility afforded
by riverbanks to railroad engineers brought the ‘iron horse’ to its alluvial lands, changing
the character of the former strictly agricultural valley.
The first complete voyage between termini ran in 1855, and the effective transit
time across the isthmus was reduced to about a half day, if one had the dollars to afford it.
Despite the steamers and trains’ dependence on coal, the functioning of the corridor
continued to rely on draft animal power. Mules energized the unloading, loading, and
coaling of ships at the wharves; ships, carrying up to two or three tons of cargo and the
luggage of 700 travelers, were stevedored in as little as two hours. The railroad`s
profitability and traffic volume restored the area’s distinctive transithmian economy. The
first years of full-length operation were shaped by competition between different
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steamship companies, but gradually the Pacific Steamship Company consolidated a
transit monopoly.100
Rail technology gave humans unprecedented power over space and time.101 The
rail-steamship route made it easier to get from Panama to California than to Panama’s
contemporary capital, Bogota, which lay distant on a 2200 meter high moorland.102 The
environmental impact and degree of landscape change entailed by the railroad exceeded
that of the overland-fluvial route monopolized by the Spanish. Besides a new
passageway, the first transcontinental railroad created a “new axis of settlement,” with a
train station being built every four miles on average along the tracks. The last station
before reaching the Pacific was named “Rio Grande Station,” located close to the river’s
confluence with its tributary the Rio Cardenas, northwest of Panama City.103
The transit region’s prolonged and problematic position within transnational
networks of migration and accumulation had long-lasting consequences. Panama became
a necessary land bridge for Americans trying to reach the newest and most promising
territories under Washington’s jurisdiction. The railroad line was established parallel to
the Spanish mule road, with its sustaining local cattle economy sprawling into the urban
hinterland. The route effectively perpetuated the territorial organization of Panama in
function of the interoceanic corridor’s demands, and split, at least culturally, the
cohesiveness of the Colombian isthmus of Panama.
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The Panama Railroad era was of the earliest and most significant encounters
between tropical Central America and the U.S.. Under the terms of the Mallarino-Bidlack
treaty, American troops landed routinely on the railroad region to maintain the desired
level of stability among the passageway’s domestic rebels and civilians. However,
traversing Panama put gold-hungry and entrepreneurial Americans in contact with the
‘natives.’ This early encounter is historically significant because it gave Americans early
images of later (virtual) neo-colonial subjects.
The racist and white prevailing supremacist ideologies prevailing in U.S.’s
Antebellum culture shaped early accounts of Panamanians. A discourse on the tropical
world had begun to take form in North Atlantic societies, especially in temperate Europe.
This new perception of the tropics defined the Neotropical world by juxtaposing it with
Europe; its climates, peoples, vegetation, and diseases posed a threat to the sub-tropical
normalcy. Ideas about race accompanied this assessment of the darker biome, later
reinforced by the systematization of a Social Darwinist worldview in the North American
academy. As Nueva Granada first fell under the influence of the United States, this new
way of perceiving tropical ecosystems found its way to the isthmus’ cultural scene.
Moreover, according to Stephen Frenkel, the category of the tropics in the specifically
American social and environmental imaginary, was born, or at least greatly shaped during
the construction and operation of the railroad. This culture of nature transposed to the
Panamanian tropics brought along an ideological baggage that would help legitimate
further intervention in Panama and possibly elsewhere in tropical America. 104
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After the completion of the railroad, the isthmus, still a part of New Granada,
received the scholarly attention of American natural scientists, as would other narrow
areas of Central America during the search for a feasible waterway site. This
development was part of a major reconnaissance of lands previously uncharted by whites
throughout the world. Between 1870 and 1873, an American expedition led by Lieutenant
Thomas O. Selfridge, enlisting G. A. Maack as chief geologist, was entrusted with
scouting Panama’s potential for a possible canal route. Although not without alternatives
and political squabbling, the isthmus of Panama’s legitimacy as a viable site for the first
interoceanic waterway was consolidated.
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THE FRENCH CANAL 1880 – 1894

North Atlantic societies in the Old World shared a neoclassical notion of
hydraulic engineering dating back to the eighteenth century. In this Enlightenment
tradition, the “‘proper’ channel for a river is not necessarily the one it has carved for
itself: By means of canals and locks it can be guided by men [sic] along a straight and
level line.”105 During the nineteenth century, industrialized nations were able to develop
networks of navigation canals connecting their territory to a degree unprecedented in
human history. However, natural geologic processes and colonialist expansion had
determined that the dreamed interoceanic canal would have to be built through
Neotropical territory, where many cultures still held to pre-industrial, non-capitalist
patterns of water and resource use. The construction and control of an interoceanic canal
would be an important asset in an emerging imperial scene in which the domination of
nature through technology granted economic benefits and international prestige.
In the mid-nineteenth century, “modern transportation and communication
systems,” writes historian Jessica Teisch, “helped set our modern world in motion.”106
Social metabolism between mankind and nature accelerated following gradual changes
accruing in the repertoire of western environmental management. Applied forms of
scientific knowledge— especially civil engineering, fluid mechanics, and hydraulics—
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increased mankind’s capacity to transform landscapes with engineering works of
unprecedented scale. By the 1870’s, coal had overtaken charcoal as the main fuel for
producing iron products, while western metropoles had adapted to the potential of oil and
natural gas as energy sources. Furthermore, Teisch claims that beyond a quantitative
intensification of interconnectedness, “the application of iron, steel, and fossil fuels to
industry, transportation, and communication changed the way that people and nations
interacted.”107
The construction of an interoceanic canal would require the cultural diffusion of
these technologies from the center to the periphery of the world system. A growing faith
in the progressive, transformative power of technology ensured a receptive response to
this transmission from neocolonial elites. The social contexts that nurtured the emergence
of modern hydraulics were imbued in the nature and applications of these knowledges,
bringing along a new host of contradictions to the colonial world. Moreover, these
technologies enabled the large-scale transfiguring of nature into natural capital,
introducing ‘new’ ecosystems into transnational systems of profit and empire-making
schemes. For example, within the cultural philosophy of the era’s hydraulic science laid a
fundamental contradiction between sustainability and continued capital accumulation, in
addition to environmental assumptions about Neotropical hydrology.108
In 1869, the same year a man-made waterway once again linked the Red and
Mediterranean seas cutting through the mostly desertic Isthmus of Suez, Mexico City
would launch the construction of its long awaited Gran Canal, a massive artificial body
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of water to address the city’s everlasting sewage problem. The advent of the Second
Industrial Revolution coincided with the Porfiriato, Mexico’s prolonged nation-making
dictatorship. Besides the British capital and financial backing, both projects were
examples of similar statist projects boasting of their nation’s triumph over nature. Late
nineteenth century Mexico City’s efforts to address endemic floods brought the first
steam shovels and massive dredges to Latin America. These massive, mobile machines
were the largest ever employed by humans.109 The use of heavily capitalized technology
to exert a particular human vision over nature also requires similarly forceful
manipulation of laborers, as the hydraulic society thesis would maintain. Mexican
historian Luis Aboites calls the decade of the 1880s “the Great Hydraulic” era, a process
in which hydrological resources were to be exploited as a condition for the flourishing
foreign direct investment in Latin America.110 This regional process of change illustrates
the fact that as ‘man’ attempted to assert control over nature, he had to do so over his
fellow brothers and sisters first.
The French were the first to attempt the hydrologic holy grail of merging the
world’s oceans at the isthmus’ waist. The best route to attempt a sea-level canal, it was
determined, was located in the historic transit region. Through the eyes of foreign canalbuilding engineers and entrepreneurs, the appreciation of the natural world, and tropical
ecosystems especially, is reduced to appraising single elements of nature for their
potential economic value. Seen from an industrial-hydraulic perspective, the isthmus is
thus abstracted and compartmentalized down to its physical and hydrologic elements,
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rendering it an exploitable geo-hydrological canvass. It featured four main longitudinal
ridges. Two of these run parallel to the coasts and the other two down the middle of the
landmass. The area’s topography features three valleys, “not unlike the spaces between
the fingers of a man’s hand,” which are “practically continuous except where eroded
through by the Isthmian streams.”111 This condition left “four fundamental engineering
ways” for the construction of a deep water canal:


A sea-level cutting from ocean to ocean through the four ridges



Sea-level sections at each end and a high lake between the two central ridges



Lakes in the two valleys next the coasts and a cutting through the central ridges



Lakes in each of the three basins112

Early in the planning stage, it became clear that the largest task at hand was how to
win control and manipulate the region’s rivers, in addition to piercing the continental
divide at its lowest point. The projected line was crossed by the unruly Chagres River
twenty-eight between Gamboa and Colon, and thirteen times by the Rio Grande between
Culebra and Panama. “To prevent these rivers from entering the canal and to avoid the
currents and dangers of overflow that would otherwise follow, channels or derivations are
cut,” an American engineer analyzing the French effort in hindsight explains, “to
accommodate the waters of the rivers and to carry them to the sea in beds on each side of
the canal.”113 The stage of ecological science and environmental thought in the nineteenth
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century, however, did not recognize that diverting water from natural streams and rivers
caused irreparable damage to riparian wetlands.114
The Rio Grande figured prominently in French plans for a sea-level canal, and
also in their later remedial plans to build a lock-canal. The Rio Grande’s basin had to be
conquered, although the challenge would not be as difficult as the taming of the
formidable Chagres. Paralleling the railroad, the northwest-southeast line drawn by
engineers across the transit region’s slopes intercepted the axes of both rivers, from the
point where they debouch from the highlands and turn toward the oceans. Partial
derivation and damming of the Rio Grande was an important part of the work done by the
Pacific section of the construction crew.115 On a hill close to the river’s middle basin, the
French began the erection of a dike on the west bank. The dike was the beginning of a
proposed dam to enclose a harbor close to Panama City, and would help “close these little
rivers and have the main entrance at La Boca.”116 Besides riverine sedimentation,
particles carried by ocean currents could also obstruct the Southern navigation and access
channel. The shallow harbor and tidal conditions at Panama Bay were to be addressed
with a tidal lock, which never materialized.117 French engineers never fully grasped the
hydraulic challenge posed by the Rio
Around 20, 000 workers, almost all from the West Indies, came to labor on the
effort. The need to provide potable water to the workforce necessitated the creation of
reservoirs, since no natural lakes existed in the transit region. The Rio Grande Reservoir

114

Jeffrey K. Stine, America's Forested Wetlands: From Wasteland to Valued Resource (Durham, N.C.:
Forest History Society, 2008), 14-15.
115
Charles Rodgers, Intelligence Report of the Panama Canal 1889, 21-22.
116
Report of the Board of Consulting Engineers for the Panama Canal (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1906), 318.
117
McCullough, Path Between the Seas, 119.

53

was built in the upper part of the river between 1882 and 1889, covering an area of 72.77
acres.118 The French intended to use the area’s abundance of precipitation in their favor,
even if the choice of a sea-level canal hindered a more utilitarian approach of hydrologic
features. Although the Panamanian Cordillera reaches its lowest point in East Central
Panama, it doesn’t completely fade; thus, a canal would inevitably have to traverse a
mountainous spine; the obstinate will to claw a sea-level canal between the seas ignored
the isthmus topography and geology
In the lower Rio Grande, at La Boca, the French erected the necessary works for
the construction of dredges and other machinery. The prevailing miasma theory
governing disease epidemics, which linked “illness to the exposure to vapors emanating
from marshes rife with rotting vegetation,”119 shaped the appreciation of lowland fluvial
landscapes. John Bigelow, an American observer of the French effort, described the
infrastructure at the mouth of the Rio Grande as “constantly exposed to the pestilential
exhalations of the mangrove swamps through which that stream finds its way to the sea,
and through the bed of which the canal is expected to flow. To keep up the force requisite
for the mechanical operations to be carried on at this point,” Bigelow surmised, “will
prove extremely difficult, on account of its insalubrity.”120
The attempt to build a sea-level canal, like Ferdinand de Lesseps had done at
Suez, doomed the Canal from the start. Malaria and yellow fever did not distinguish
between Antillean Creole or Parisian engineer, and as the vectors of these tropical
diseases were given more range to expand with the excavations, the result was
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approximately 22,000 work-place casualties. The state of science and technology at the
time meant that the French did not a proper understanding of the public health and
engineering obstacles at hand.
De Lesseps had planned a sea-level canal and pursued it at appalling human costs.
The physical reality was that the topography and character of Panama were wildly
different from that of the sandy dunes conquered in Egypt. Skyrocketing mortality, heavy
rains, an earthquake, and mudslides hindered excavations. The deforestation, explosionaided excavations, wetland transformation, and social change brought about by the
French project all helped establish Panama as the definitive setting of this millennial
dream of uniting the oceans, while smirching its name in the Old World for good. The
corruption-laden collapse of the French enterprise created popularized the word
Panamiste (Panama) as a synonym for graft and corruption in Europe, discouraging other
powers from retaking the project.121 The failure even helped bring down one of France’s
hero, de Lesseps, and the Third Republic.122
The French project of linking the two coasts of Colombia’s isthmus of Panama
occurred at a time when the market economy and modernization was straining the
relationship between indigenous peoples and post-colonial states throughout Latin
America. These relations became particularly contentious toward the end of the
nineteenth century, as export booms throughout the region exacerbated encroachment
upon indigenous territories. The Pacific coastal region, spanning 11,300 kilometers from
Panama to Ecuador was home to the one of the largest black Latin American population,
and was left after emancipation a relatively autonomous peasantry. During the same
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period, the larger Caribbean region roughly from Cartagena to Colon was home to an
independent peasantry that was being increasingly marginalized by the expansion of
cattle ranching. Leal and Van Ausdal assert that “black people there achieved more
autonomy than almost anywhere in the Americas, and developed an egalitarian society
thanks to a rainforest economy that did not rest exclusively on land and cutting down the
forest.” However, the liberal, export-oriented land-use regimes depended on destroying
tropical rain and dry forests for monocultures,123 painting a dire future for the continuity
of these communities.
The French vision for a waterway, just like the railroad preceding it, did not
presuppose the control of non-essential lands for the flow of transisthmian traffic. The
French had acquired the rights for an interoceanic canal from Nueva Granada (Gran
Colombia), but had not requested autonomous sovereignty over any adjoining land
proper, and relied mostly on personal fortunes to subsidize the ill-fated project. Despite
their imperial tradition, the French did not have demonstrable colonial objectives in the
transit region. Marixa Lasso argues from an analysis of cartographic representations of
the project, the French did not have plans to claim any land beyond the projected
waterway’s bed, their maps projecting a canal line drawn with exclusively navigational
goals and respectful of local settlements along the line. Moreover, Panamanian elites had
no reason to fear a takeover of territory due to the excavation of a sea-level canal funded
by small bondholders. French engineering maps, as Lasso keenly observes, portrayed the
canal line as embedded in a human-inhabited transit region, crisscrossing populated
landscapes, and conveyed a “sense of continuity between the canal and previous historic
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uses of the transit route.”124 The towns of the transit region, including some of colonial
rigins and others whose roots trace back to the railroad era, were adequately represented
and factored into construction.125
In the second half of the nineteenth century, population began to grow with a
renewed vigor in the isthmus. By 1880, the population finally reached pre-conquest
levels, but only a small fraction lived in the transit region. “Despite the amount of activity
that these works inspired,” Stanley Heckadon argues, “changes to the environment were
confined to the immediate surroundings of the towns and camps which sprang up along
the railroad line or near the excavations for the canal.”126 Beyond the studies done for the
railroad, the U.S.-led surveys of potential routes, and studies accompanying the French
attempt to build a waterway, the isthmus geography remained unknown for North
Atlantic societies. After the failed French effort, more geologists and, for the first time,
paleontologists arrived in Panama.127
After their machinery rusted under the humid heat, and a chunk of the Rio
Chagres´ basin had been deforested by machete, Culebra still stood 59 meters on top of
the soil supposed to be carved. The Rio Grande was an important component of the
French effort (1881 - 1897), and a significant part of its course was to serve as the main
channel in the Pacific slope. The incomplete derivation and damming of the upper Rio
Grande were the first major transgressions on the physical integrity of the watershed,
despite millennia of human dwelling.
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THE “BIG STICK”

It was not until the Second Industrial Revolution matured that human culture
developed the capacity to stop nearly any river, no matter how mighty. The structural use
of concrete became a common practice in Western engineering, to a degree not seen since
the times of the Romans.128 Throughout the Caribbean, during the initial period of the
formation of a working class, foreign capital was increasingly being directed towards
large, extractive infrastructure projects, bent on tapping into the traditionally agrarian
region’s natural capital.129 Similar to the era of the California Gold Rush and the Panama
Railroad, developments and historical forces operating within the U.S. are essential for
unpacking environmental change in early twentieth century central Panama.
During the first decades of the twentieth century, North Atlantic states came to
control an overwhelming majority of world space.130 The U.S. shared the colonial
impulse of the great powers at the time, and American expansionism found clear
expression in the manhandling of Spain and takeover of colonies as far as the Philippines.
The Gilded Age period in late nineteenth century U.S. history witnessed the closing of a
once seemingly inexhaustible internal frontier, one that had an important effect on
American society and shaped its relationship with nature through the concept of
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“wilderness.” The closing of this frontier posed a de-facto spatial barrier for
uninterrupted capital accumulation. John Soluri points to the “increasing availability of
once ‘exotic’ and expensive goods produced in the tropics” as representing “an everyday
sign of rising U.S. hegemony in tropical Asia and Latin America.”131 However, a “strictly
mercantilist view,” Alexander Missal argues, “does not suffice as an explanation for U.S.
policies abroad and their support at home around the end of the nineteenth century.”132
The overseas expansion of the U.S. was galvanized by intellectuals and policy
makers who systematized an outwardly looking popular sentiment. For the purposes of
environmental change in Panama, the most important of these thinkers, beside Theodore
Roosevelt, was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (1849 - 1914); his views are expounded in
his 1890 landmark study, The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Rather than a
monument to global commerce and cooperation, the Panama Canal was conceived as a
symbol of authority and power, its main utility being that of ensuring the advantage in
mobility to U.S. warships. The logic of foreign military post establishment, which took
the form of grand scale military bases during this period of industrialized warfare, was an
intrinsic part of the neocolonial project, and thus an important determinant for the need of
building an interoceanic waterway and acquiring rights to adjoining land. A mercantilist
impulse, compounded by a military desire to project power, put American society at an
imperial crossroads.
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During the late nineteenth century, the development of landscape and
environmental management in the U.S. was an element of the emergence of a new liberal
state, as the government responded to social and conservation problems at home and
abroad.133 Population growth and a developing environmental awareness coincided with
advances in technology, medicine, and empire building, enabling qualitative changes to
the nation’s environment making practices. These developments were preconditions for
even attempting to encroach into tropical America and to alter the waterscapes to the
extent necessary for the isthmian canal. The geographic and cultural juxtaposition of the
U.S. and the tropical world made the tropical biome “the dominant environmental
imaginary of extracontinental U.S. expansion, just as wilderness was for continental
expansion.”134 American cultural attitudes toward nature and the non-human world were
embodied in its pragmatic and reductionist hydraulic technique. The influence of this
technological assemblage upon landscapes, both social and biophysical, would
increasingly impinge upon Central American and Caribbean spaces during the early
twentieth century.
In 1902, the Conservative victory in the civil war known as the Thousand Day’s
War, which engulfed Colombian national affairs and had devastating effects on the
isthmus, compelled T.R. to take drastic measures to assert his imperial vision. Roosevelt
resorted to American exceptionalism, recently enshrined in the Platt Amendment; by
doing so, the U.S. employed a RealPolitik-driven, empire-building approach to
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appropriating the space for the route. The executive branch instigated an oligarchic revolt
on the isthmus. In order to secure the territory surrounding the canal, the U.S. intervened
in Panamanian politics in 1903 in order to incite a revolution that (successfully) broke
ties with Bogotá and established a nominally independent Panama. The result was an
“independent” state, in the purest nominal sense, standing as a brazen compromise
between native and foreign elites masked in the contemporary façade of banana
republics.
The result of U.S. intransigence, the infamous Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903,
did not boast a single Panamanian signee, granted extraordinary power and jurisdiction to
the U.S. in the isthmus to build the canal. Due to the weakness of the route’s host
country, the American canal intelligentsia could alter the very demographics of Panama,
if deemed necessary to meet the logistical and managerial challenge of constituting a
labor force in a sparsely inhabited former Colombian province.135 The U.S.’s continental
expansion had been built on a foundation of ethnic cleansing, slavery, and white
supremacy. This legacy would be central to the American imposed modes of social and
labor organization associated with canal construction, an imprint that ran deeper than in
most company towns throughout Central and Latin America or the Caribbean.
The proximity of oppressed West Indians in the Caribbean provided a pool of
workers that made the bulk of the workers that ultimately dug the big ditch. Racist
attitudes shaped the construction period and the management of the project. The U.S.
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created an effective colony within the isthmus, enabled mainly by domestic collaboration
and asymmetric power relations. The Americans deemed the isthmus’ labor and
productive forces at the beginning of canal construction as inappropriate in myriad ways.
The U.S. formed a global labor force in the Zone, which eventually reached upwards of
42,000 workers, exceeding far the number enlisted in the republic´s banana monocultures
and rivalling the infrastructure overhaul of Cuba´s sugar industry or the establishment of
the Venezuelan oil industry during the same period.136
Although at the outset of the U.S. effort the intent was to build a sea-level canal
resembling French designs, the project shifted to a lock and lake based canal soon
thereafter. The hydraulics of the Panama Canal and the endeavor to wrest control over the
Río Chagres has received recent scholarly attention. The insights of these researchers are
especially useful to understand the hydraulic transformation of the Rio Grande valley.
Castro Herrera argues that, for the cultural group that envisioned the canal and arranged
for its construction, the most salient element of the natural order was the coincidence of a
series of biophysical circumstances — geographic location, topography, climate,
hydrography. The lessons of the French effort and the American pragmatic approach to
hydraulics enabled the adoption of a “technological solution” capable of parlaying into
advantages what hitherto had been the waterway’s greatest obstacles: heavy tropical
precipitation patterns, and a difficult topography.137 Ashley Carse’s work, exploring the
“historical relations between canal administration and the diverse human communities
living in the surrounding region,” reminds U.S. that the Panama Canal, similar to other
assemblages of “natural infrastructure,” “has been constructed across human groups who
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know and interact with the forest in different ways.” Central Panama’s forests, and by
extension its rivers, were “landscapes already morally, economically, and ecologically
bound up in agrarian life.”138
Paul Sutter argues that aspects of the U.S.’s environmental management in the
isthmus worked against imperial interests, mainly those espoused by the Isthmian Canal
Commission’s (I.C.C.) sanitation campaign to eradicate the carriers of deadly tropical
fevers. Although these diseases were endemic to the region and had already helped defeat
one effort at a waterway, “the conditions that produced mosquitoes were not intrinsic to
tropical nature per se but resulted from the human-caused environmental disturbances
that accompanied canal building.”139 The immediate consequence of much of the changes
on the landscape were catastrophic, as mosquitoes thrived in stagnant pools of water in
humid construction sites cleared of vegetation. “This realization,” Sutter observes, “did
not mesh well with an American ideology of tropical triumphalism premised on the
notion that Americans had conquered unalloyed tropical nature in Panama.”140
Whereas the French had blamed the winds of the sea, eating apples, or the jungle
vapors for their deaths, the U.S. effort was undertaken after the development of the germ
theory in the 1890`s, opening the door for the novel idea of insect transmission to gain
acceptance among Progressives. This scientific leap uncovered mosquitoes as the vectors
of yellow fever and malaria, but its acceptance did not consolidate until years into the
138
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construction of the canal, preventing engineers from knowing that most of their
transformations made the problem worse. William Gorgas’s led a sanitation and
comprehensive mosquito eradication campaign which permanently lowered the risk of
contracting a tropical disease in the area, and allowed for the construction to proceed by
reducing the death rate among white skilled workers.141 Pneumonia and tuberculosis
continued to ravage West Indian workers unabated. Some of Sutter’s best examples of
these contradictory environmental management practices were taken from the waterscape
changes and environmental disturbances that derived from the Rio Grande’s basin
transformation, the subject of the rest of this section.
The construction period is divided in three stages reflecting changes in leadership.
The first stage (1904—1906), headed by American Midwest railroad engineer John
Findley Wallace, was doomed by uncontrolled tropical diseases and bureaucratic red-tape
mandated by a stingy I.C.C. The lack of a real plan and knowledge of the hydrologic
realities condemned this first stage to be a futile attempt to reproduce the French sea-level
utopia. American observer wanted the venture to ‘Let the Earth Fly,’ and a still token
workforce struggled to put up digging numbers in vain. Bates gives us a diagnosis of the
misguided excavation characterizing this phase, during which putting up impressive
numbers of unearthed tropical soil to ensure continued funding trumped all other
concerns:
no spoil was going to the dams. They are too far away. None was going to the railway
embankments around the lake-to-be; none was going to the breakwaters or valuable reclamations;
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none to raise Colon. Where? Just to the nearest places, without reference to anything but disposing
of the output. The putting of tens of millions of cubic yards of spoil into dams and embankments is
a very different proposition from the procedure of this record-striving exhibition.

The second stage (1905—1907) the new chief engineer, the builder of Great
Northern Railway John Frank Stevens, set the priority of constructing the civilian and
community infrastructure of the Canal Zone before proceeding with letting the earth fly.
After the personnel, at least the white skilled workers, was materially provided, Stevens
transformed the project with a railroad engineering approach to canal building which led
him to implement a rail-based system with shifting tracks that could dispose of the soil
from excavation and blasting sites, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the novel
Bucyrus steam shovels.142 Understanding that landslides and heavy rains necessitated
brisk and orderly disposal of the soil from the sites of excavation, the identification of
landfill sites to absorb massive amounts of earth was imperative.143 In order to transform
the landscape and waterscape and erect the massive concrete lock chambers, the U.S.
brought in: 102 large, railroad-mounted steam shovels, enormous steam-powered cranes
able to handle concrete, dredges, giant hydraulic rock crushers, pneumatic power drills,
and cement mixers. More importantly, the key to construction success would be the
railway system whose main use was to function as a conveyer belt to move loosened soil
to places where material could serve U.S. imperial interests: landfills, causeways, earthen
dams, and others.
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The plan adopted during this second stage fully displayed the characteristics of a
“socio-technical system,” constituted by “technical, organizational, scientific, and
political-legislative components.144” The envisioned canal was a mechanized waterway
composed of three sets of locks, three dams, a series of reservoirs, and a “network of
remote hydrographic stations from which measurements of rainfall and changes in river
and lake elevations from across the watershed are transmitted to a central station.”145 The
Pacific section of the canal was to feature two set of locks due to the nature of the slope,
Miraflores and Pedro Miguel locks.146 Temporary construction towns and permanent
Zonian towns, both gold-rate (for white civilian and military) and silver-rate (for black
and non-U.S.-born), were to be erected within the valley of the Rio Grande and
throughout the Canal Zone. The transit region’s savannahs, tropical dry and rainforests,
and reclaimed wetlands would give way to a logic devoted to the functioning of an ever
more demanding waterway.
Ensuring a freshwater supply for the Canal Zone was one of the earliest and most
defining concerns of the U.S. technocratic regime. It was one of the first tasks taken up
by the Second Isthmian Canal Commission and considered vital for continued
construction. Besides water for lock operation, sanitation for workers remained a priority
for the American effort, and the plan for the provision of water adopted was a chain of
reservoirs across the isthmus with mains. There were seven reservoirs in the supply plan,
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three of which were in the Pacific slope: Rio Grande,147 Ancon Hill, and Cocoli Lake.
The assemblage of aqueducts and hydrants that accompanied the reservoir enabled an
unprecedented control of water drainage and distribution, a prerequisite for mounting the
engineering and logistical effort represented by the canal’s construction.
U.S. engineers began to overcome the lack of knowledge about the hydrology and
geology of the route. The fact that the waterway was determined to be a lock-canal that
would be integrated with the ecosystem services of the area forced technocrats to conduct
studies of the region.148 In his treatise on The Agricultural Possibilities of the Canal
Zone, Hugh Hammond Bennett gives us one of the best descriptions of the stream banks:
“Along the Rio Grande from its mouth to near Corozal and lying between the Panama Railroad
and the lower slopes of the Ancon and Sosa hills are about 2 square miles of low, flat, alluvial land
which is subject to overflow and which remains in a permanent soggy condition….The soil is a
dark colored, very fertile silt loam to clay loam which, with good protection from overflow, such
as may be secured by the construction of open ditches and dikes, would produce fine crops of rice,
sugar cane, and probably a variety of vegetables. Heavy applications of lime would likely be
required to bring this land into favorable condition for healthful plant growth. At present it
supports a dense growth of mangrove and other water-loving plants.”149

Bennett asserts that the lands in the western hinterland of Panama City had similar
productive potential as those of silt loam below Gatun Dam, used by natives for growing
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“coconuts, bananas, and other moisture-loving crops.”150 The most common form of
travel was by canoe along the isthmus shore. Forests featured canoe-ready hardwoods
such as oaks, lignum vitae, and Santa Maria, as well as a myriad of soft-wooded
species.151
While the land-use policies of the Canal Zone were not yet established, the
hydraulic decisions made by the engineers threatened the continuity of the landscape
described by Bennett. The 1906 engineers’ report states that, while some rivers were to
be cut off by dams, “others are to be taken into the canal. They must, however, be
temporarily diverted during the excavation of the canal; and in the case of the Rio Grande
this involves a tunnel seven-eights of a mile long.”152
The transformation of the waterscape truly reached a grander scale during the
third stage of construction (1907—1914), under the military leadership of Army officer
George Goethals. Despite its advantageous orientation, the Río Grande was a “silt
bearing stream” hindering navigation in parts of its course. Its bed was composed of mud,
coral, sand and multiple varieties of clay. Nonetheless, U.S. engineers were determined to
stop the silt of the Río Grande valley from reaching the Pacific, and subsume its valley
into the most important artificial strait in the world. The rest of this section will explain
how the valley’s landscapes were radically transformed during the canal’s construction
and first decades of operation, when engineers completely transformed the Rio Grande’s
watershed, from its upper and middle basins down to the estuary in its coastal mouth. The
same environmental problems that doomed the French afflicted the American effort, but
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rapid developments in science, technology, and managerial organization of workers
increased its chances to succeed.
The upper Rio Grande near its headwaters was virtually annexed to the Rio
Chagres via the narrow Culebra Cut through the continental divide. The Culebra Cut
captured the Rio Grande’s waters for Gatun Lake, virtually uniting two distinct
watersheds. The railroad conveyor belt was crucial in getting the unwanted earth out of
the way in this continental divide. Throughout the strait, mountains were transformed to
reduce their gradient, preventing devastating land and mud slides. The carving of Gaillard
cut, as it was originally called by the U.S. engineers, had a traumatic effect on West
Indian workers due to historic mortality rates. The Rio Grande reservoir, close to
Culebra, was drained by a spillway, and the eponymous, temporary town of Rio Grande
was dismantled in 1910.
Beginning in the vicinity of the stream’s junction with the Rio Pedro Miguel, the
Rio Grande entered its middle basin, where its meandering course carved fertile
lowlands. In some locations, the bed of the Rio Grande was linear enough that the I.C.C.
was able to straighten and incorporate it into the canal. The Pedro Miguel locks, the first
set encountered upon crossing the Cordillera from the Caribbean toward the Pacific,
admits water from Gatun Lake, connecting the two largest oceans for human purposes. It
is around this area that the Rio Grande starts to form a clear axis with the Rio Chagres.
The Rio Grande valley proved instrumental in cheapening the conquering of the
Pacific slope.153 The lake on the Pacific slope, Miraflores Lake, was to be created by
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damming and diverting the Rio Grande in the area between the old town sites and
present-day lock sites of Pedro Miguel154 further north and Miraflores.155 Engineer H.F.
Hodges explains:
“The lock and dams at Miraflores form a barrier closing the lower Rio Grande Valley and
retaining the intermediate level of Miraflores Lake…. The lake receives the flow of the Cocoli,
Pedro Miguel, Caimitillo, and Cameron[sic] rivers, all small streams formerly tributary to the Rio
Grande. In the rainy seasons the discharge of these streams may be considerable, but in the dry
season it reduces to a small amount… The main supply of this lake then is the water let down from
the summit level when passing vessels through Pedro Miguel lock.” 156

The elongated and voluminous lake was more conducive to maritime traffic than the Rio
Grande’s course, since its meandering middle course and shallow bed posed challenges
for American engineers.157 A dam was located in the west side of this new lake “to
complement the surrounding hills and enclose the lake. The flow from the Rio Grande
and Pedro Miguel Rivers, and one or two other smaller streams, also enters the lake.” The
dam’s design also presented spillways to capture the flow of tributaries to “prevent the
water from giving trouble in the valley below the locks.”158 During the lake’s
construction, the Rio Grande’s tidal interaction necessitated the erection of dike “to
protect the pit against ﬂooding by the tidal waters in the river bed:”159
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“This dike, composed of a trestle ﬁll of rock and earth, prevented the water from the sealevel
channel from entering the steam shovel cut 5,000 feet long, 500 feet Wide, and 4-6 feet below
mean tide, extending to Miraﬂores Locks. 160

The Miraflores locks, a twin-chamber set of twin locks abutting the spillway, was/is the
southern terminus of the lake. From Miraflores, “a channel 150 ft. wide with side slopes
of 1 on 3 was to be excavated to La Boca.”161 The lake allowed the construction of a
hydroelectric power substation and a water purifying plant to supply the Canal Zone’s
and Panama City’s needs.162
On August 23, 1913, the Rio Grande, which had been temporarily diverted, was
“turned into” the pit created by the earthen dike soon to become Miraflores Lake.163 The
artificial lake logically had negative environmental consequences- albeit in a smaller
scale than those caused by the creation of Gatun Lake in the Caribbean. Besides
submerging 1.6 miles of fluvial lands, the project also destroyed wetlands by filling them
with rock and earth. The Miraflores dump, located between the Cardenas river and the
railroad track, reclaimed the land upon which fort Clayton was built.164
Through the Rio Grande’s middle and lower course, floodlands predominated,
especially alluvial lands that had been historically used for livestock and tropical market
agriculture. American environmental ethics brought a different regime of land-use, felt
particularly by the transit region’s wetlands and mangrove forests. Representations of
160
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vapor-emanating marshes rife with rotting vegetation had left a deep imprint in the
American environmental imaginary. Although the germ theory of disease was gaining
acceptance in the transnational scientific community, Stine argues, “the wetlands
themselves remained under a cloud of suspicion.”165 The mosquito theory raised new
doubts about the healthfulness of insect-breeding swamps, further associating wetlands
with pestilence. While cases of bad science producing appropriate or sustainable
environmental practice and engineering have been recorded, the intersection of medicinal
and hydraulic knowledges, in this instance, reinforced older, harmful attitudes toward life
sustaining ecosystems.
The Rio Grande’s marshy lower basin would receive the bulk of the spoil from the
excavations at the continental divide. The tropical estuary located at the river’s mouth, La
Boca, allowed tidewater into the lower basin. The general consensus among engineers of
the period was that filling these marshlands was the most effective way of building the
waterway. A series of landfills, embankments, and dredge-work in the Pacific coast
completely transformed the estuary of the mouth of the Rio Grande, creating a single
channel. The tortuous course of the river was widened and straightened, strategically
submerging “the deadly swamps of the Rio Grande back of Panama.” With little effort,
Bates boasted, and “less than a million of money,” the I.C.C. could “transform these
breeders of otherwise unconquerable Chagres fever and malaria into the bed of a clear,
fresh lake, and the death-giving morasses would be replaced by life-giving waters.”166
Moreover, these wetland could be further converted into hydraulic resources, “the
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mangrove thickets afford[ing] splendid material for fascine mattresses in connection with
dyke and harbor works.” 167
In the lower Rio Grande, the central destination for debris was the landfill that
would become the town of Balboa, the imperial showcase and administration capital,
west of Panama City. Bates lauded the decision to reclaim land in the area, since it
“add[ed] to the domain of the zone, affording a new and better located and ideally
sanitary site immediately adjacent to and seaward from the present town.”168 However,
these new town would by no means be an extension of dangerous, tropical Panama City,
but would be a city fit for white civilization to enjoy the benefits of having conquered
nature. The transformation of the waterscapes was followed by radical changes on the
Canal Zone’s urban landscaping and forestry. The Rio Grande’s mouth would host white,
gold-roll Balboa and a silver quarter town called La Boca. Two other military
fortifications were built to ‘secure’ the Pacific port and locks in reclaimed coastal areas:
Fort Amador and Albrook Air Force Station.
In addition to the connection established between the coastal islands and Balboa,
the history of the Rio Grande had been effectively married to the Rio Chagres’s. The
Zone’s hydrology would suffer a new major transgression in the name of the everlasting
search for water sources. Population pressures on water demands and a long drought
extending from 1929 to 1930 acted as the main motivations to secure new sources of
water for the storage needs of the watershed.169 Panama City’s metropolitan area
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population in 1905, the second year of construction, stood at 22,000.170 In 1922, U.S.
President Calvin Coolidge authorized the creation of a second dam and reservoir on the
Rio Chagres, utilizing its tributary known as Alajuela in its upper basin. Madden lake,
currently known as Alajuela lake, was completed in 1936 after the completion of Madden
dam, and the area of 22 square miles it occupies were expropriated from Panama, again
under the terms of the 1903 treaty.171 Despite this expansion of storage capacity, the
political control of waterworks and distribution systems remained a point of contention
for U.S.-Panama relations.
A new form of American tropical landscape design and urbanism was shaped in
this colonial encounter with Panama’s ecosystems. The influence of landscape architects
William Lyman Phillips, the pioneer of tropical landscaping, and Frederick Law Olmsted
Jr. determined the aesthetics of Zonian planning for decades after the construction period.
The Zone’s verdant urbanism was a synthesis that anticipated greenbelt towns of the U.S.
in the 1930’s, while adapting to the tropics contemporary urban tendencies associated
with the City Beautiful Movement.172 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, a new variant to the philosophy of American forest management was also being
shaped in overseas colonies, and might have played a role in the treatment of nonurbanized spaces.173 However, there was an imperative to urbanize as little of the Zone as
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possible, per George Goethals’s request, suggesting that forested lands better served the
imperial mission for their defensive properties against terrestrial attacks.174 Although the
surviving forests of the watershed might seem to attest to a successful nature
conservation scheme, these forests were by no means natural. New species were imported
from elsewhere in the Neotropics, including Asia and Africa, and drainage within urban
and ‘forest’ areas was perfected to a point where waters never formed pools. 175
As the U.S. got increasingly involved in the isthmus, as Julie Greene notes,
“officials struggled to build a comfortable society for white Americans—one they might
proudly call a civilization—in the zone.” The initial 100% turnover rate for American
officials led to the importation of every luxury and comfort from the imperial metropole.
The material inequality between the Zone’s paradisiacal Gold Roll quarters and its Silver
Roll tenements rivaled the larger contrast between the transit enclave and urban Panama.
The Zone benefited from the Canal’s hydropower, and Zonians enjoyed electricity before
even many factories were electrified in the mainland U.S.
Due to their close proximity to American territories, Panama City and Colon’s
landscapes were sanitized, rivers and settlements were sprayed with pesticide, streets
paved, houses fumigated, screened, and heightened, modern water and sewage systems
installed, all in an imperial effort to “pull the teeth” out of the tropics.176 Ironically, the
U.S. government demanded small payments from Panama for these projects, even if the
I.C.C. deemed these “part of a bioterritorial effort to buffer white populations and
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infrastructure from human and environmental threats that were, at least in part,
byproducts of the construction of the canal itself.”177 Although Panama’s urban citizens
along the transit region benefited from this spill-over of progressive American
environmental management, the spatially unequal application of these health measures
across the country exacerbated historic inequalities.
Besides its separation from Panamanian ‘natives’ and its landscaping aesthetics,
the Zone itself was segregated into a socio-racial hierarchy modeled after the Jim Crow
system, reflecting the Silver Roll and Gold Roll binary. The silver label, used to
designate “low-skill” and darker hues, denoted the medium used to pay most workers.
White colonists, mostly bureaucratic Zonians, were remunerated in gold. This unequal
system, which also segregated housing on the Canal Zone, created internal borderlands.
As Michael Donoghue puts it, “The gold towns of Ancon, Balboa, and Diablo on the
Pacific… evolved into sites of safety and comfort for white U.S. citizens. In their
psychological geography such communities constituted Wilderesque ‘our towns’ rather
than the silver towns of La Boca, Paraiso… that in their eyes denoted blackness,
inferiority, and threat of crime.”178 In La Boca, the silver quarters were deliberately
“hidden” from Balboa on the south side of Sosa hill. Balboa, built upon the largest
landfill of the Canal Zone, was designed to epitomize the most progressive aspects of
American civilization, with carefully manicured ocean drive-ways, a park and plaza
system, and strategic port and harbor. Reese and Reese give us a glimpse of how the new
commuting patterns in the former estuarine area worked out:
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“Olmsted recommended that the new portion of the tramway line, which was planned to connect
port facilities and Panama City be laid around the back of Sosa Hill… bring[ing] ‘native’ workers
from the city and black workers from La Boca179 directly to their jobs without crossing Balboa’s
Prado.”180

In 1956, citing safety concerns due to its location next to the southern entrance of the
canal and fuel storage tanks, the Zone authorities removed West Indians from La Boca.
Sparing the “dangerous fuel tanks,” officials demolished old wood-and-screen housing,
replacing the stock with concrete structures for white Zonians.
Most of the settlements of the Canal Zone, however, were established after the
violent depopulation order of 1912. Before this date the U.S. had embraced “a liberal
policy toward rural settlement” and smallholders, evident in the surveys of agricultural
potential conducted by Bennett. However, as construction works neared a close, this
policy was reassessed. The U.S. exercised its legal right to expropriate land deemed
necessary for “canal purposes” using force, legitimized through an eminent domain
claim. This enclosure, as Carse deftly puts it, “marked the transition” of the Zone’s
mission “from transportation as a socio-technical project that could mesh with, and even
benefit from, agricultural land using the same region to a government project to produce
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a landscape that served narrowly defined purposes.”181 American technocrats considered
that, within this new logic, “the new Zone ought to be a place that separates North
Americans from Panama.”182 Following the construction phase, all “Antillean” workers
were forced to abandon the Canal Zone. Panama City’s neighborhoods close to the
former mouth of the Rio Grande, where Afro-Panamanians had settled since the second
half of the nineteenth century, mushroomed into much denser slums. Wooden shacks
became a fixture in places like El Chorrillo, Calidonia, and Marañon.183 These urban
residents were effectively transferred from areas with Zonian-provided water services to
Panama’s system of water and sewage services.
Article II of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty specifically granted “the United States
in perpetuity… the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named, Perico, Naos,
and Flamenco.” These islands were virtually annexed to the coast via a breakwater and
causeway constructed from rock and debris of excavations. This took the form of a
causeway meant to protect the entrance channel. This landform diverts crosscurrents that
carry soft material from the shallow harbor of Panama City into the canal channel. The
causeway linked the islands that had historically served as harbors for Panama City with
the mainland Balboa, a complex known as the Causeway Islands of Amador.184
Conflicts over the use of hydrologic resources surfaced during the first half of the
twentieth century, but the asymmetric power of the U.S. and its hegemonic control over
181
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land and labor prevented democratic outcomes. In his nationalistic monograph on the
history of the Rio Chagres, published at a time of climaxing tensions over the Canal
Zone’s sovereignty, Bonifacio Pereira denounced the high prices charged by the U.S. to
Panama for the provision of potable water and electric power. The purifying plant at
Miraflores drew its water from Gatun Lake, which in turn drew most of its water from the
newer Madden Lake. This interconnected system of sewer and aqueducts remained in
American hands well into the Cold War. A similar arrangement was in place for the
provision of hydroelectric energy.185 In response to recent threats by the Zone’s
government to cut these services if Panama refused to pay maintenance tolls, Pereira
exhorted the Panamanian government to build its own hydroelectric and purifying
facilities to curb this dangerous dependency.186 Besides the outright control of the Zone’s
space and appropriation of the waterway’s profits, the Panama Canal imposed myriad
structural limitations on Panamanian sovereignty and prosperity that even today are not
fully understood.
Even after its symbolic opening in 1914, the functioning of the Panama Canal
entails, to the present day, a perpetual battle against nature, taking the form unending
dredging and maintenance with heavy floating machinery. The persistence of mudslides,
channel and storage sedimentation,187 prodigious rainfall seasons, and sprouts of water
hyacinth necessitated permanent abatement. The narrow strait linking the Rio Chagres
and Rio Grande was an elaborated artifice remade constantly. Near the Rio Grande’s
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headwaters, the Panama Canal Dredging Division, one of the most important cogs of the
canal’s infrastructures, was expanded and relocated to the town of Gamboa, close to the
Continental Divide on the Chagres.188 As dredging superintendent John Claybourn
justified the relocation to Canal Zone Governor Jay Morrow: “…first as a safeguard in
case of obstruction of … [Culebra] Cut by slides, the logical location being between any
dredging and the dumps in Gatun Lake; second [because] increased Canal traffic, as well
as the size of the ships, introduces a serious menace to our fleet when moored in the…
Cut at Paraiso.”189
Panama’s continued efforts to revise the 1903 treaty finally yielded results with
the advent of the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy and the signing of the 1936 Hull-Alfaro
treaty. Not ratified until months before the outbreak of the war in 1939, this accord ended
the protectorate-status of Panama, curbing unilateral intervention and the undisputed right
to eminent domain practiced by Washington for thirty-six years. More important for
Panamanian productive activity, commercial interests addressed the harmful smuggling
of goods out of the Zone, and obtained access to the Zone’s previously forbidden market.
The colonial enclave had effectively split the country in two, and this split was evident in
food supply networks. Hence, in a stereotypical banana republic and U.S. client-state, the
fruit that was consumed in the capital, and logically within the Zone, was being imported
from abroad.190 Nonetheless, calls for Panamanian sovereignty and for truly bilateral
approaches to treaty renegotiations were ignored, failing to prevent some of the worst
socioecological follies perpetrated by the U.S. in Panama in ensuing years.
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The domination of the isthmus’s tropical ecology and polity virtually granted the
U.S. free rein to experiment with environmental racism and pursue its imperial interests
unimpeded. As John Lindsay-Polland notes, “Prevailing U.S. attitudes toward the tropical
environment, civilization, and race served to rationalize the ways in which the United
States pursued its objectives.”191 He chronicles different episodes of American abuse of
the Canal Zone. Among these uses of tropical ecology, he lists clandestine environmental
activities, covert chemical weapons tests, and Cold War training for tropical guerrilla
counterinsurgency.192 Although less obvious than the long-term effect of controlling the
hydraulic infrastructure, these episodes altered the country’s political ecology in myriad
ways, some of which persist into the present-day.
The politics behind the unification of the watersheds of the Rio Grande and the
Rio Chagres had a determining effect on the conditions of urbanization in the transit
region. At either end of the interoceanic corridor, the presence of the Canal Zone blocked
the possibility of a natural suburbanization south of Colon and north of Panama City.
Except for the physical and political boundary posed by the Zone, as Donoghue puts it,
“urban expansion would have spread out like a concentric fan from these coastal ports.
Instead the boundaries of the Zone forced development to the east and west of Panama
City and Colon,” and in the case of the capital on the Pacific, “creating an elongated
metropolis… that still plagues its residents to this day.” Moreover, “the results fostered a
lightly populated Canal Zone with very dense Panamanian populations at either end of
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the enclave.” This “peculiarly warped urban development pattern,”193 especially in the
Pacific where Panama City’s ecological footprint has grown irreversibly, resulted in the
severe environmental deterioration of rivers and potential water resources in the capital’s
historic hinterland.194
The main environmental problems threatening prospects for sustainable
development in Panama derive from the destructive expansion of the cattle ranching
frontier.195 A staple of the local economy since the days of the Spanish colonial corridor,
The livestock sector was able to exploit a wealthy new market after the restrictions on
food imports were lifted with the aforementioned 1936 treaties, also known as the “meat
and beer treaty.” In the eve of World War 2, Franklin Roosevelt authorized 50$ million
dollars for construction works related to the defense of the canal, which generated the
migration from rural Panamanians to the countryside to earn wages. The Canal Zone’s
consumption drove the growth of the livestock industry in Panama’s interior, leading to
accelerated deforestation in the rest of Panama. The spatial organization of the isthmus
imposed by transitismo hinged on the one-dimensional transit sector and its heavily
monopolized supporting activities, and this system was perpetuated by the establishment
of the Canal Zone. Castro Herrera argues that “the presence of an ecologically sustainable
enclave,” where technocrats foregrounded forest conservation and urban planning,
“stimulated the tendency toward unsustainability that dominates the rest of Panama.
Unsustainability … has built an ever tighter circle around the enclave of
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sustainability.”196 Following the War, the cattle ranching footprint in Panama began to
expand significantly. In 1952, 85% of the Panama Canal watershed was forested, a vital
part of the assemblage making up the transit economy. Although estimates vary, by 1983
this ratio had descended to 30%.197
The fact that the Panama Canal is a multiple lock canal built over a mountain
range changed the waterway’s articulation with local water provision in qualitative
ways.198 Every ship’s lockage, during which water is lost to the oceans at a rate of
101,000 m3 per downward cycle, is a wasteful enterprise. In other words, about 52
million gallons of freshwater are lost during each ship’s transit. If current developments
continue, the water supply will not suffice to provide for central Panama’s citizen needs
and to fuel interoceanic transit. Increasingly uncertain precipitation patterns have raised
doubts about the Canal watershed’s, effectively the Rio Chagres’s basin, ability to
support an expanded lock infrastructure and growing population. The transit region
continues to rely heavily on electricity generated at hydroelectric plants in the canal’s
watershed. Ironically, the canal and the surrounding urban areas share the freshwater
reserves stored in the watershed’s reservoirs. Heckadon argues that “Because economic
growth in the basin has been both haphazard and unplanned,” and one should add
‘unequal,’ the deterioration of the Canal’s fragile, but immensely vital, watershed is
almost inevitable. This process “threatens the very ability of the ecosystem to continue to
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produce and store fresh water in sufficient quantity and quality to meet the enormous
demands that will be placed upon it.”199
The canal’s planning and execution was carried ignoring the political, economic,
human, and environmental realities that had existed in the transit area. Americans, more
so than the French, saw in the isthmus, a tropical palimpsest for the application of
revolutionary mechanical and energy advancements. This tabula rasa mentality was
reminiscent of earlier treatment of native and imported labor, and reflected the attitudes
toward tropical peoples forged by the currents of environmental determinism and
scientific racism common during the New Imperialism period (c. 1880s – 1914).
Retroactively, it is safe to assert, that the lock-based waterway’s design entailed
transformations of such scale and impact that, according to Lindsay-Polland, “it is
doubtful' that the Canal would have been constructed under the current requirements of
US environmental legislation.”200
In the Rio Grande valley, albeit to a lesser scale than in the Chagres’s, the
environmental cost in ecological resilience and biodiversity was devastating. The
Chagres river basin had been the home of independent communities of black and mestizo
farmers that harkened back centuries. Although ever changing and affected by a plethora
of variables, their lifestyles were better attuned to nature, dependent upon subsistence
plus polycultures, employing variety of age-honed methods and crops, where small
domestic plots were the main productive units. Unconnected to distant markets or foreign
capital, local barter economies had functioned for centuries to provide non-local
necessities. These populations were forcibly quarantined from the Zone, under racist
199
200
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notions of environmental determinism and medicine. Frenkel notes that, starting in the
construction period and evident in planning documents, the I.C.C. “semantically (and
later literally) depeopled the future Canal Zone, homogenizing it in their descriptions as a
vast ‘jungle’.”201 Cartographic representations of the Zone’s space played a major role in
removing the forest peoples inhabiting the transit region from the technocratic and
collective imaginary of U.S.202

201
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CONCLUSION
The results of this thesis support the study of longue durée environmental change
based on ecological materialism proposed by environmental historians such as Jason
Moore. The history of human-driven impacts on terrestrial ecosystems of the isthmus of
Panama contains episodes of scattered throughout millennia. Nonetheless, the
intensification of environmental change in the last five centuries reflects this global
pattern of worsening rifts in social metabolism. Although certainly not a linear process,
the importation of technologies, and accompanying cultures, developed in Europe and the
North Temperate Zone resulted in the acceleration of environmental degradation starting
with the Conquest. The development of an interoceanic corridor and the subsequent
monopolization and industrialization of transisthmian transit reinforce Moore’s thesis for
understanding the reproduction and spatial properties of global resource frontiers.
There have existed competing routes for much of its history, but prior to paved
highways and cars, the width of the isthmus rendered those routes unviable when
compared to the one running through Central Panama. The isthmus’ dependence on
transit and its historic fetish by the elements of society that controlled its role in the world
system had the biggest impact on Panamanian ecosystems of all other productive
activities or ideals. The unique geography of this East-Central area would condemn it to
depend on global trade patterns and economics to define its leitmotif. This mode of
production – the facilitating of transit of goods, people, and capital across its strategic
jurisdiction – was inherently disconnected from the soil and land, thus it was socially and
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ecologically unsustainable. The recent expansion of the Panama Canal was conceived
within a culture of nature that did not eschew the mechanistic and domination-driven
attitudes toward non-human nature imposed by a century of U.S. control.
Besides Moore’s model of world-ecology, the history of the Rio Grande
illuminates some of the critical turning points in the water history of Panama’s transit
region and, in turn, sheds light on the problematic environmental history of transitismo as
a mentality, one responsible for shaping modes of social and territorial organization and
determining the country’s collective relation to nature. The evolution of local
environmental change, and attitudes toward nature, needs to be understood within a
dialectical view of European expansion through resource frontiers whose landscapes
constitute conditions as well as consequences of this expansion. Transitismo determined
the nature of Panama’s insertion into the emerging world market and ecological system
during the sixteenth century, and proved to be the main driver of environmental change
and resource use ever since. The transit-dependent mentality was chiefly responsible for
the industrialization of the interoceanic route, and thus of the structural problems derived
from it. Thus, as Castro Herrera argues, a history of the environmental impact of
transitismo mentalities becomes, by definition, an environmental history of Panama.
Shortly after conjuring the independence of Panama and gaining sovereign rights
over the Rio Grande’s territory, the US Army Corps molded the Rio Grande to decant the
water of the mighty Caribbean Rio Chagres into the Pacific. Rather than a big ditch, the
Panama Canal is, as Jaén Suárez notes, a river that drains into two seas. In order to fulfill
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the much prophesied goal of connecting the world’s oceans, however, nature had to be
transformed and harnessed to an unprecedented degree and scale. In the 1900s, pragmatic
U.S. engineers decided upon a lock-based canal that relied on the natural watershed to
provide freshwater for the functioning of the locks.
When the Panama Canal Review reported the disappearance of the Rio Grande
following a sudden transformation of its upstream river bed, it had already been rendered
an insignificant current. By 1955, not only was the waterscape transformed by relatively
large reservoirs, but the valley itself had been refashioned by dredging and embankments.
The environmental journalist offered a triumphalist view of the past glories of the river to
legitimize and naturalize the position of the colonizers in the landscape. However, the
fact that the journalist does not report the largest transgression on the river’s integrity, its
impoundment to create Miraflores Lake, reveals how dangerous can selective memories
be when reconstructing socioecological processes, especially in imperial contexts.
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